Church-State Relations and the Social Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr by Berg, Thomas C.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 73 | Number 4 Article 4
4-1-1995
Church-State Relations and the Social Ethics of
Reinhold Niebuhr
Thomas C. Berg
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas C. Berg, Church-State Relations and the Social Ethics of Reinhold Niebuhr, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 1567 (1995).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol73/iss4/4
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS AND THE
SOCIAL ETHICS OF REINHOLD NIEBUHR
THOMAS C. BERG*
In this Article, Professor Thomas C. Berg explores the
life and writings of Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971), using
Niebuhr's theology and social philosophy as a basis for
approaching issues of religion and politics, church and state.
Niebuhr's philosophy, Professor Berg suggests, provides a
framework for a politics that, without being cynical,
recognizes limits on human capacities to achieve perfection
through any social or political ideal-in Niebuhr's own
words, a system of "proximate solutions to insoluble
problems." Such a framework in America, Professor Berg
argues, demands a government that is neither purely
secularized nor purely sanctified-in legal terms, a
government that accommodates religion instead of actively
establishing or suppressing it. In a Niebuhrian world,
religious viewpoints and insights must be able to participate
in the making of secular policy, but religious citizens and
activists should remain humble about translating ultimate
values directly into solutions for political problems. The
government should also permit religiously affiliated
institutions providing education and social services to
participate in government-funded programs in those areas,
and government should recognize its limits by allowing
conscientious religious objections to general laws.
To many observers, debates in the past decade over church-state
relations often have been frustratingly polarized. On one side, groups
committed to a highly secular government and political system argue
that religion is a backward and divisive force standing in the way of
society's progress toward mutual understanding and tolerance. On
the other side, traditionalist religious groups claim that secular forces
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Northwestern University; M.A., University of Oxford; M.A., ID., University of Chicago.
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are leading America to collapse, and that a return to certain historic
religious tenets and an incorporation of those tenets into government
policy and public ceremonies can save the nation from its social ills.
1
People on each side in these "culture wars",2 tend to make
sweeping claims about both the goodness of their own perspective and
the evil of the other What too often is missing from the debate is
any sense of humility, any awareness that one's own perspective may
be partial, and any acknowledgement that although moral views (left
or right) must relate to politics, social life is usually too complex to
allow for simple solutions.
When a social commentator complains about a missing sense of
complexity and ambiguity, he or she often is said to have raised a
"Niebuhrian" point.4 The reference is to Reinhold Niebuhr, the
American Protestant theologian, social theorist, journalist, and
political activist. In a public career spanning from the Great
Depression to the Vietnam War, Niebuhr earned a reputation as a
biting critic of claims to final virtue or knowledge in the social and
political spheres. First assaulting the early twentieth century's
confidence in "progress," he later attacked Marxism's faith in
1. For general discussion of this polarization, see STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE
CULTURE OF DISBELIEF- How AMERIcAN LAW AND POLmcs TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS
DEVOTION 15, 22 (1993) (deploring the ways in which secular-oriented culture treats
religious belief as "just another hobby," as well as the "liberal-bashing that often charac-
terizes the rhetoric of the religious right"); JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS:
THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 250-71 (1991) (describing "polarization" of views
of religion and politics held by "orthodox" and "progressive" groups). As Hunter points
out, the arguments over the legal propriety of religion in politics play a role in the broader
"culture wars" because law sets "the rules for resolving public differences." Id. at 253.
2. HUNTER, supra note 1, at xi.
3. In the words of Professor Douglas Laycock:
As between some serious secularists on one side, and some serious religious
believers on the other, there is little more equal concern and respect than four
hundred years ago, when we were burning each other at stakes. If you read the
direct mail fund-raising literature some of these groups send out, it is clear that
there are people on all sides of these issues who think that folks on the opposite
side are a force for evil in the world, and a serious threat to the things we hold
dear.
Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 841, 842 (1992); see also HUNTER, supra note 1, at 161-70 (cataloging "extreme"
and "superficial" attacks by each side in publicity campaigns).
4. See, e.g., JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN LEFT
19 (1992) (outlining "Niebuhrian" approach critical of overconfidence of both "the
anticapitalist Left" and "the antigovernment Right"); Richard Wightman Fox, Lasching
Liberalism, 109 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 277, 281 (1992) (reviewing CHRISTOPHER
LASCH, THE TRUE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS CRITICS (1991) and
describing historian Lasch's critique of political optimism as "Niebuhrian").
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proletarian revolution and criticized the complacency of American
culture and religion in the 1950s.
While attacking such "pretensions," however, Niebuhr maintained
the necessity of relating moral and religious values to political
decisions; he himself kept up a continuing stream of journalism on
current issues and a running involvement in a series of political and
social causes. He thereby outlined and personally exemplified an
approach to religion, morality, and politics that has influenced
statesmen and theorists from Martin Luther King, Jr., to George
Kennan to Jimmy Carter.5 As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., put it, Niebuhr
"cast an intellectual spell on [the] generation" that came of age during
economic depression, world war, and nuclear threat.6 And although
Niebuhr's analyses were grounded in a religious outlook, they have
appealed to many thinkers with little or no religious impulse.7
This Article explores various implications of Niebuhr's social
ethics for current issues of religion and politics, including specific legal
issues of church-state relations. I argue that Niebuhr's thought can
contribute to our understanding of church-state legal relations by
illuminating the roles that religious and secular views play in public
life-both their virtues and their dangers. I also point out ways in
which Niebuhr's insights are particularly valuable for modem
America. His ethical theory, of course, does not ineluctably lead to
particular legal solutions; moreover, legal rules themselves are blunt
instruments for the application of any sophisticated social theory. But
one can explore the problems Niebuhr identifies and suggest how
legal doctrines can serve (in Niebuhr's words) as "proximate
solutions" to those problems.
The time is ripe for close examination of Niebuhr's thought on
church and state. In recent years, interest in Niebuhr has resurged
across the political and religious spectrum,' and political conservatives
5. See infra part II.A; see also E. J. DIONNE, JR., WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICs
225 (1991) (discussing Carter's devotion to Niebuhr's thought).
6. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., ReinholdNiebuhr's Long Shadow, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
1992, at A17.
7. For example, Southern historian C. Vann Woodward relied on the "ironic
approach to history" found in Niebuhr's writings: "I realize that Niebuhr's view of human
strivings is based on theology, a subject definitely beyond my province. Whatever its
theological implications-and I have frankly never explored them-the view has a validity
apart from them that appeals to the historian." C. VANN WOODWARD, THE BURDEN OF
SOUTHERN HISTORY 193 (3d ed. 1993).
8. See, e.g., CHARLES BROWN, NIEBUHR AND HIS AGE: REINHOLD NIEBUHR'S
PROPHETIC ROLE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1992) (describing how the liberal
Protestant view is indebted to Niebuhr); HENRY B. CLARK, SERENrrY, COURAGE, AND
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and liberals alike have jostled to claim him as authority for their
positions.' His influence, unparalleled among American religious
thinkers from the Depression into the Cold War, waned in the 1960s
as a new generation of activists labeled his views too "pessimistic
about radical social change."'" Lately, however, much religious
activism on the left has been chastened, although not defeated." At
the same time, many Americans are uncomfortable with aspects of
politically active fundamentalism. Thus, Niebuhr has proven an
attractive alternative for a new generation of thinkers. Scholars are
exploring Niebuhr's views on church-state legal relations as well, but
they have focused only on the question (albeit a crucial one) of
religious influences on public policy and lawmaking, ignoring the
implications of his thought for other issues, ranging from prayer in
public schools to funding of religious institutions.
12
In examining church-state problems through the writings of one
modern religious thinker, I obviously am not focusing directly on the
language of the Constitution's religion clauses or on those clauses'
WISDOM: THE ENDURING LEGACY OF REINHOLD NIEBUHR (1994) (same); RICHARD
Fox, REINHOLD NIEBUHR: A BIOGRAPHY (1985) (general biography); MARK A. NOLL,
ONE NATION UNDER GOD? CHRISTIAN FAITH AND POLITICAL ACTION IN AMERICA
160-61 (1988) (endorsing Niebuhrian insight from a conservative evangelical Protestant
perspective); REINHOLD NIEBUHR AND THE ISSUES OF OUR TIME (Richard Harries ed.,
1986) (same); REINHOLD NIEBUHR TODAY (Richard J. Neuhaus ed., 1989) (presenting a
variety of political and religious perspectives on Niebuhr); RONALD H. STONE, PROFESSOR
REINHOLD NIEBUHR: A MENTOR TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1992) (same).
9. Compare MICHAEL NOvAK, THE SPIRIT OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM 315-32
(1982) (using Niebuhr to argue for free-market economy on basis of need to limit
government and to harness self-interest) with STONE, supra note 8, at 244-45 (arguing that
throughout his life Niebuhr believed "[s]trong governmental leadership was ... necessary
to correct disproportionate economic power").
10. Ronald Preston, Reinhold Niebuhr and the New Right, in REINHOLD NIEBUHR
AND THE ISSUES OF OUR TIME, supra note 8, at 89-90.
11. See, e.g., K. LLOYD BILLINGSLEY, FROM MAINLINE TO SIDELINE: THE SOCIAL
WITNESS OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES passim (1990) (describing loss of
political influence of liberal-leaning National Council of Churches).
12. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, Different Religions, Different Politics: Evaluating the
Role of Competing Religious Traditions in American Politics and Law, 10 J.L. & RELIGION
1, 21 (1994) (commending Niebuhr's approach for political debate). The particular issue
of religion in politics is also the sole focus of Stanley Hauerwas & Mike Broadway, The
Irony of American Christianity: Reinhold Niebuhr on Church and State, SOUNDINGS 33
(1994) (erroneously stating that "Niebuhr seems never to have thought specifically about
the legal relation of church and state in America").
Other legal scholarship explores the contributions that Niebuhr's ethical theories can
make to lawyers' professional ethics. See Timothy W. Floyd, Realism, Responsibility, and
the Good Lawyer: A Niebuhrian Perspective, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 587 (1992); Eric
E. Jorstad, Note, Litigation Ethics: A Niebuhrian View of the Adversary Legal System, 99
YALE L.. 1089 (1990).
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historical background. Nevertheless, Niebuhr's approach is relevant
to the interpretation of the religion clauses because it has significant
parallels with the approaches taken by the framers. Niebuhr sought
to construct a social ethic, including an analysis of religious tolerance,
by balancing the views of the Enlightenment and the Protestant
Reformation, without uncritically accepting either source.
13
Likewise, the American commitment to religious freedom, both in
1791 and later, has been characterized by a combination of Enlighten-
ment and evangelical Protestant views concerning conscience and the
political realm. 4 Although much of this Article focuses on the
function of religion in modem society rather than on the original
understanding of the religion clauses,"5 the arguments here are not
irrelevant to constitutional discussion. Indeed, the precise import of
the religion clauses' broad principles is affected at least in part by
current conditions. Professor Suzanna Sherry has challenged religion
clause scholars to answer forthrightly the question: "What purposes
does religion serve in a modem democracy, and how should we best
foster those goals?"' 6 This Article's discussion of Reinhold Niebuhr
is one response to that challenge.
Theologically based arguments, such as Niebuhr's, are crucial
participants in any discourse about religious freedom. Religious
thought offers "some of the richest resources for thinking about the
human' 17 in general, and especially about the interaction of religion
and politics. Recent legal scholarship on religion and government has
probed the insights of writers from Dostoevsky8 to feminist
13. See infra part II.C.
14. See infra notes 47-62 and accompanying text.
15. Even if the non-originalist nature of these arguments makes them irrelevant to
constitutional interpretation, Niebuhr's insights are still relevant for making policy
regarding church and state. Nonconstitutional arguments are important, since the Supreme
Court recently has pursued a (halting) path of turning over matters of religion to elected
policymakers. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,890 (1990) (holding that
a state may prohibit sacramental use of peyote but also may accommodate such religiously
motivated behavior by exempting it from law); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618
(1988) (holding that the Adolescent Family Life Act, under which religious groups receive
government grants to develop youth counseling programs, does not, on its face, violate the
Establishment Clause). Nonconstitutional considerations play a particular role in the issue
of the influence of religious beliefs in lawmaking. See infra part I.A.
16. Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 149.
17. MICHAEL J. PERRY, MORALrIY, POLITICS & LAW 183 (1988).
18. William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L. 843, 847-53
(1993) (discussing the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor from The Brothers Karamazov, as
told in FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, NOTES FROM THE UNDERGROUND AND THE GRAND
INQUISITOR vii (Ralph E. Matlow trans., 1960)).
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theologians. 9 With the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on religious
freedom in continued disarray," we need all the insights we can get.
This Article begins by setting forth three paradigmatic current
views of church and state-including "Enlightenment" and religious
views-and the need to critique and balance them.2' Part II then
turns to Niebuhr: his life, his overall theory of social ethics, and
themes in his work that criticize and balance the church-state
perspectives presented in part I. Those Niebuhrian themes indicate
that while close religious involvement with government can present
dangers of religious arrogance and coercion, a thoroughly secularized
public order presents its own dangers, either because it recognizes no
moral values in politics at all or because it reintroduces arrogance and
coercion in the form of secular ideals. Part III suggests how church-
state legal doctrines can reflect Niebuhr's insights concerning the need
for both moral vigor and humility in politics. Treating first Niebuhr's
own favorite subject of religious involvement in political decision-
making, I argue that religious views can and must play a role, but that
it is legitimate to ask that proponents of such views express a degree
of humility by putting their arguments in terms to which other citizens
can relate. Thrning to other church-state questions, I suggest that a
secularization of culture fueled by an activist secular government is a
serious problem, but that the way for government to address that
problem is not by sponsoring its own religious activities, such as
school prayers or municipal religious displays. Instead, government
should accommodate the independent religious activity of citizens and
groups by allowing private activities in public forums, by affording
concientious exemptions from burdensome laws, and by permitting
religiously affiliated institutions that provide education and social
services to participate in publicly funded programs on the same terms
as other groups. The Article concludes with some final reflections on
religion and politics.
19. Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A
Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 453, 458-74 (1992) (discussing how religion
has often harmed and sometimes helped women).
20. In Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2491-94
(1994), the Court once again, as it has for six years, decided an Establishment Clause case
without setting forth a clear majority standard for Establishment Clause analysis. For
discussion, see Thomas C. Berg, Slouching Toward Secularism: A Comment on Kiryas Joel
School District v. Grumet, 44 EMORY L.I. (forthcoming 1995).
21. See infra part I.
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I. CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON CHURCH AND STATE
At the risk of oversimplification, current perspectives on the
proper relationship between religion and the state in America can be
placed into three paradigmatic groups.'
A. The Leading Church-State Perspectives
1. Enlightenment Secularism
The first perspective on religion and politics is the "Enlight-
enment" or "secularist" perspective. This outlook tends to focus on
the dangers to liberty and public peace that may be posed when
religion allies with or influences government. To prevent such
dangers, adherents to this view claim that strong rules should be set
up to prevent the state from aiding religion or incorporating religious
influences.
The Enlightenment perspective has been expressed vividly by
Justice Blackmun. Concurring in the result in Lee v. Weisman,' in
which the Court held that the practice of government-initiated and
-sponsored prayers at public school graduation ceremonies violated
the Establishment Clause, Justice Blackmun defended strict separation
of church and state:
When the government arrogates to itself a role in
religious affairs, it abandons its obligation as a guarantor of
democracy. Democracy requires the nourishment of
dialogue and dissent, while religious faith puts its trust in an
ultimate divine authority above all human deliberation.
When the government appropriates religious truth, it
"transforms rational debate into theological decree." Those
who disagree no longer are questioning the policy judgment
of the elected but the rules of a higher authority who is
beyond reproach.... Democratic government will not last
long when proclamation replaces persuasion as the medium
of exchange.24
22. These are broad, heuristic categories and, to some extent, represent polar
viewpoints. I do not now address more nuanced standards put forward by various courts
and scholars, such as the "endorsement" as opposed to the "coercion" test for Establish-
ment Clause violations.
23. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
24. Id. at 2666 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Note, The
Free Exercise Boundaries of Permissible Accommodation Under the Establishment Clause,
99 YALE L.J. 1127, 1131 (1990)); see also iL at 2666 n.10 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
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This view emphasizes, as Justice Blackmun expressed elsewhere, that
the purpose of church-state separation is to protect "secular liberty"
from the threat of religious fanaticism.'
Until the early 1980s, this perspective on church and state
informed many of the leading decisions under the religion clauses,
especially those involving state aid for religiously affiliated schools.
Under this view, religion is seen as a "private matter"26 that must
not become too intertwined with public institutions because it will
engender the kind of coercion and "divisiveness" that pose "a threat
to the normal political process."'
This interpretation of the religion clauses is also common among
legal scholars. Kathleen Sullivan, for example, argues that the First
Amendment's ban on establishments of religion "implies the
affirmative 'establishment' of a civil order for the resolution of public
moral disputes."' This "secular civil order," the "culture of liberal
democracy," reflects the framers' primary goal of privatizing religion
in order to prevent wars of religious strife like those that plagued
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe. In Sullivan's view, the
"secular civil order" demands that religiously affiliated services be
denied a role in publicly funded education or welfare programs and
religious beliefs not serve as the basis for legislation.29 Likewise,
William Marshall argues for "a presumptive," though not absolute,
"barrier against religious participation in the public square."3 In his
account, "[b]ecause fear is a primary motivation for the adoption of
a belief structure"-especially, apparently, a religious one-"the
believer may be upset by any suggestion that her adopted belief
system is fallible." Such "[flervent beliefs fueled by suppressed fear,"
in turn, "are easily transformed into movements of intolerance,
judgment) (" '[A] religion, even if it calls itself the religion of love, must be hard and
unloving to those who do not belong to it.' ") (quoting SIGMUND FREUD, GROUP
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO 51 (James Strachey trans., 1922)).
25. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 612 (1989) (plurality opinion).
26. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) ("The Constitution decrees that
religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and institutions of private
choice.").
27. Id. at 622-23 (striking down state aid to religious schools on this ground among
others); see also Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,413-14 (1985) (same); Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 795-97 (1973) (same); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459
U.S. 116, 127 (1982) (relying on "political divisiveness" argument to invalidate ordinance
allowing church to object to licensing of a liquor store within 500 feet of the church).
28. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195,
197 (1992).
29. Id. at 197-98, 208-14.
30. Marshall, supra note 18, at 863.
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repression, hate, and persecution."31  For several scholars, this
separationism based on a suspicion of active religion counsels against
giving religious practice special protection from state regulation,
despite the Constitution's specific protection of free exercise.32
2. Evangelical Separationism
A second paragraph in Justice Blackmun's Weisman concurrence
presents a very different argument for a strict separation of church
and state, which may be called the "evangelical" argument.33 This
view tends to come from within religious communities, and primarily
seeks to ensure that churches and believers are able to follow divine
commands and pursue other forms of religious mission free from
interference or corruption by the state. Justice Blackmun wrote:
[W]e have recognized that "[r]eligion flourishes in greater
purity, without.., the aid of Gov[ernment]." ... [E]ven the
favored religion may fear being "taint[ed] . . . with a
corrosive secularism." The favored religion may be
compromised as political figures reshape the religion's belief
for their own purposes; it may be reformed as government
largesse brings government regulation.'
This theme runs back through American history to the writings of
Roger Williams, the early Baptist dissenter from Massachusetts
Puritanism, who portrayed the true church as a garden threatened by
31. Id. at 858.
32. See Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special? Reconsidering the Accommodation
of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PIrr. L. REv. 75,178
(1990) (arguing that "the very structure of religious ideas and practice are contrary to the
mode of thought necessary to foster democratic self-governance"); Ira C. Lupu,
Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation
of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. Rlv. 555,597 (1991) (arguing that strong protection of religious
freedom "may undercut the project of constitutional democracy" because religions
"frequently claim divine inspiration" and thus "discourage skepticism"); Sullivan, supra
note 28, at 220-22 (arguing that "secular civil order" requires that religion be subject to
requirements of welfare state); cf Sherry, supra note 16, at 152 (raising possibility that
special protection for religious freedom is inappropriate because "the purpose of the
religion clauses is to allow a secular government to operate independent of the varied
religious beliefs of the citizenry").
33. I use the term "evangelical" to focus on the fact that this view originated in
America among evangelical Pr6testant dissenters. Analogous concerns are voiced by
believers from other traditions.
34. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2666 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment) (quoting Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1786), in
THE COMPLErE MADISON 309 (S. Padover ed., 1953); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985) (second and third alterations in original)).
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the wilderness of society and the state.35 Ultimately, it can be traced
to theologies of the Protestant Reformation that distinguished "two
kingdoms," temporal and spiritual, neither of which should interfere
in the other's jurisdiction.36
One might expect this approach to play a strong role in suppor-
ting the free exercise rights of churches and believers. 37 Although
this has been true, the evangelical approach surprisingly has played
more of an explicit role in Establishment Clause rulings. For
example, one of the reasons the Court gives for striking down
government-sponsored religious exercises is that they produce a
watered-down "civic religion" tailored to the purposes of the
government rather than to the religious variety of the people.38
Moreover, in decisions striking down funding of religious schools, the
Court has stated that government supervision designed to ensure
proper use of the funds raises the "spectre of government
'secularization of a creed.' ,39
3. The Evangelical "Christian Nation" Perspective
Within the evangelical approach to church-state separation,
however, there has regularly appeared a significant twist-one that
Mark de Wolfe Howe pointed out in the essay in which he called
lawyers' attention to Roger Williams and the evangelical view.4"
35. For discussion of this point, see MARK DE WOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE
WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
1-15 (1965); Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71
B.U. L. REV. 455, 471-83 (1991).
36. The genesis of the Protestant "two kingdoms" theory was Martin Luther's On
Secular Authority: How Far Does the Obedience Owed to It Extend?, in LUTHER AND
CALVIN ON SECULAR AUTHORITY 3, 8-9 (Harro Hopfl ed., 1991); see also Michael W.
McConnell, "God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!": Freedom of Religion in the
Postmodern Age, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 163, 167-72 (tracing connection between "two
kingdoms" theology and the First Amendment).
37. For arguments to this effect, see Hall, supra note 35, at 513-23; McConnell, supra
note 36, at 171-72. In free exercise cases, this view probably has been reflected, though
only implicitly, in the Court's (sometimes) conclusion that "only those interests of the
highest order ... can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
38. See, e.g., Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2656-57 (rejecting such "an official or civic
religion"); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (maintaining that government-
composed school prayers tend not only to "destroy government" but also to "degrade
religion").
39. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,414 (1985) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 650 (1971)); see also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619-20 (striking down aid because
government supervision of parochial schools might "intrude on religion").
40. See HOWE, supra note 35 passim.
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While the evangelical tradition has wished to keep the churches free
from government interference, many within it have simultaneously
insisted that Christianity or religion in general be favored by law.
Such advocates seek not simply to have Judeo-Christian values
reflected in the secular laws, but to promote distinctively Christian
(particularly Protestant) religious practices through the laws.
Historically, therefore, while calling for the institutional separation of
church and state, the evangelical tradition has simultaneously
encouraged a host of religious public practices that belied any strong
separation, from official prayers to Sunday closing laws to various
kinds of government aid for churches. Professor Howe saw this "host
of favoring tributes to faith" as "so substantial that they have
produced in the aggregate what may fairly be described as a de facto
establishment of religion"41-of generic Protestantism, for the most
part.
This nonseparationist thrust of evangelical Protestantism is
particularly strong today in the arguments of some on the religious
right. An instructive example is fundamentalist David Barton, who
attacks separation of church and state as a "myth":
.That "wall" [of separation] was originally introduced as, and
understood to be, a one-directional wall protecting the
church from the government.... In other words, separation
of church and state pertained to denominational differences,
not to basic Christian principles.42
Barton begins with the typical evangelical affirmation that the sole or
overwhelming purpose of religious freedom is to protect the church
from the state. From this conception, he concludes that it is consis-
tent with religious freedom for the United States to be a "Christian
nation" in a legal sense. Barton argues not only for returning
government-sponsored prayer to the public schools, but also, for
example, for requiring legislators to swear a belief in "eternal rewards
and punishments" to ensure that they feel ethical demands to exercise
power responsibly.43 The sharp contrast between this theme and that
of "evangelical separation" is illustrated by the fact that when such a
"test oath" provision was proposed for federal offices in the
41. Id. at 11.
42. DAVID BARTON, THE MYTH OF SEPARATION: WHAT IS THE CORRECT
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE? 42-43 (6th ed. 1992).
43. Id. at 83, 257-58. To accomplish this latter goal at the federal level, at least, would
require amending or repealing the constitutional provision that "[n]o religious test shall
ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States."
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
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Constitution, Isaac Backus, fiery evangelical leader of the New
England Baptists, opposed it on separationist grounds. Backus argued
that "[n]o man or men can impose any religious test, without invading
the essential prerogatives of our Lord Jesus Christ.""
The strong "Christian America" view probably has few adherents
in the academy or on the courts. The closest theory proposed by any
prominent judge or scholar would limit the Establishment Clause to
prohibiting a preference for one particular sect45 (although even
these theorists should, in theory, oppose a preference for Christianity
in general). The view that government may officially favor Chris-
tianity or theism and disfavor alternatives is, however, more prevalent
in the broader culture.'
B. The Need to Critique and Balance Perspectives
Both Enlightenment and evangelical perspectives on religion and
government contain truth. But each one is partial and must be
balanced with insights provided by the other-insights that Reinhold
Niebuhr's thought can help uncover. As I will argue in greater detail
in part II, those evangelical perspectives that seek to promote religion
through government underestimate the costs of such efforts both to
social cohesion and to the independent role of religion as a counter-
force to government, while evangelical perspectives that emphasize
maintaining the purity of religion. through strict separation risk losing
all relevance to political life. Neither, however, is it likely that an
adequate public order in America can be built purely on secular
foundations from which religious influences are scrupulously excluded.
Religious involvement in politics provides moral vigor, a counter-
weight to the power and pretensions of the state, and, in this nation,
an essential link between the beliefs of the people and the actions of
their government.
Moreover, none of the views above alone presents a complete
account of the history surrounding the enactment of the First
44. Isaac Backus, Religion and the State, Slavery, and Nobility (1788), reprinted in 1
THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION 931, 931 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) (relating
comments delivered to the Massachusetts ratifying convention on Feb. 4, 1788).
45. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICION passim (1982).
46. See, e.g., HERBERT MCCLOSKY & ALIDA BRILL, DIMENSIONS OF TOLERANCE:
WHAT AMERICANS BELIEVE ABOUT CI.VL LIBERTIES 131-33 (1983) (reporting that nearly
half of survey respondents would deny atheists the right to "make fun of God and
religion" and that 80% believe prayers in public schools should be permitted).
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Amendment's religion clauses. Both secularist and evangelical
arguments influenced the framers. The decision to protect religious
liberty was based on an "overlapping consensus," with different
persons supporting the principle based on different normative
premises.4 7 For example, one of the prime episodes in the struggle
for religious liberty, the defeat of religious tax assessments in Virginia
in the 1780s, was engineered by such a coalition. While James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson crafted and pressed the theoretical
arguments in the legislative halls, "[t]he necessary political pressure,
the demand for disestablishment, the threat not to ratify the
Constitution unless something were done about religious liberty, came
from the evangelical dissenting churches."'  Madison's Memorial
and Remonstrance49 itself skillfully interwove Enlightenment con-
cerns about religiously based strife with evangelical arguments about
the primacy of religious duties and the weakness and corruption of
established religions. On the one hand, Madison made the En-
lightenment argument that taxation to support religion "will destroy
that moderation and harmony which the forbearance of our laws to
intermeddle with Religion has produced amongst its several sects."50
On the other hand, he pressed the evangelical argument that
"employ[ing] religion as an engine of civil policy... [is] an unhal-
lowed perversion of the means of salvation," and pointed out that
"eclesiastical [sic] establishments, instead of maintaining the purity
and efficacy of religion, have had a contrary operation."'5
For much of the last fifty years, discussions of religious freedom
in legal writings have tended to emphasize the secularist justifications
and ignore the religious. For example, in its first and most enduring
47. See John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OxFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1987) (introducing the concept of an overlapping consensus); Henry S.
Richardson, The Problem of Liberalism and the Good, in LIBERALISM AND THE GOOD 1,
10-11 (R. Bruce Douglass et al. eds., 1990) (defining the concept in such terms); see also
Timothy P. Hall, Religion and Civic Virtue: A Justification of Free Exercise, 67 TUL. L.
REV. 87, 89-90 & nn.11-12 (1992) (exploring arguments "which together create an
overlapping consensus in favor of a robust principle of religious liberty").
48. Douglas Laycock, The Benefits of the Establishment Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV.
373, 374 (1992). The Establishment Clause also had a significant element of federalism,
that is, protecting state establishments from federal interference. See, e.g., Joseph W. Snee,
Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U. L. Q. 371. But
the various substantive, normative premises described in the text also clearly played a role
in the conclusion that the new federal government should not establish a religion.
49. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance (1785), in CHURCH AND STATE IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 68 (John F. Wilson & Donald L. Drakeman eds., 1987).
50. Id. at 71.
51. 1& at 70.
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confrontation with the history of the religion clauses, the Court in
Everson v. Board of Education" referred solely to the contributions
of Madison and Jefferson,53 saying nothing about the role of Protes-
tant dissent in developing the intellectual framework for religious
freedom. This omission recently has been corrected by a flood of
important historical work showing, at least, that "the religious
justification for religious freedom had great force in the colonial and
founding periods."'  Serious analysis now cannot ignore the
influence of members of dissenting Protestant sects, such as Isaac
Backus and other Baptists, as well as the theological affirmations even
of "enlightened" figures such as Madison and Jefferson. 55
However, one should not take the corrective too far. William
Lee Miller has reminded us that "[t]he Enlightenment, with its edge
of skepticism," was indeed also
present in the Revolution, in the new nation's institutions, in
key founders, in the mind of significant segments of the
people-and, in effect, in the great silences and protections
and negations of the Constitution itself .... When one
hears imperialistic claims about the place of religion in the
foundation of America's political institutions one needs to be
reminded again not only of the diversity of the colonies but
also of the role in the American founding of the Enlighten-
ment, of deism, of a certain skepticism about and eman-
cipation from religious preoccupations in the late eighteenth
century, precisely in the instruments of the American
founding.
52. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
53. Id. at 11-13.
54. Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional
Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 158 (1991).
55. See, e.g., ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED
TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
21-31 (1990) (tracing the influence of Protestant dissent, especially its influence on
Madison); HOWE, supra note 35, at 1-15 (arguing that First Amendment reflects the
"theological theory of disestablishment" exemplified by Williams "no less firmly" than it
does the Enlightenment); Hall, supra note 35, at 505-12 (tracing similarity of views
between Roger Williams and James Madison); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1425-49,
1452-55 (1990) (tracing the influence of Protestant dissent, especially its influence on
Madison); Smith, supra note 54, at 156-66 (noting that both Baptists and deists affirmed
the "priority" and "voluntariness" of authentic religious beliefs).
56. William Lee Miller, The Moral Project of the American Founders, in ARTICLES OF
FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE AMERICAN
PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 17, 35, 36 (James D. Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990).
1580 [Vol. 73
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
Miller likewise argues that "[t]he distinctive . .. feature of the
American beginning was neither the religious underpinnings nor the
emancipation from them but the combination."'
Indeed, the two primary arguments in Memorial and
Remonstrance reflect affirmations shared by evangelical Protestants
and Enlightenment deists. At the outset of the document, Madison
argues that the "duty towards the Creator" is "precedent, both in
order of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil
Society," and that this duty "and the manner of discharging it...
must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man."58
These claims concerning the "priority" and "voluntary" nature of
religious beliefs (to use Steven Smith's terms)59 resonate with both
Enlightenment and evangelical themes. That religious claims are
"precedent ... to the claims of Civil Society" reflects both social-
contract theory, stemming ultimately from John Locke, and "two
kingdoms" theory, stemming from Luther and other Protestant
reformers.' The proposition that religious beliefs must be voluntary
to be effective was fundamental both to deists, who thought true
religion must follow from the exercise of reason, and to evangelicals,
who thought saving faith could follow only from the moving of the
Holy Spirit.6' In short, both views contributed, from their differing
premises, to the conclusions "that religion is essentially distinct from
civil government, and exempt from its cognizance; [and] that a
connection between them is injurious to both."'6
At the time the First Amendment was ratified, it was relatively
easy for evangelical and Enlightenment views to form an overlapping
consensus in favor of religious freedom. Because government was far
less active than it is now, a policy of separating the governmental and
religious spheres could, for the most part, satisfy both views. By
leaving religion alone, government would leave religious conscience
free, satisfying evangelical concerns. At the same time, a requirement
of leaving religion alone also would satisfy Enlightenment concerns,
57. Id. at 37; see also Martin E. Marty, On A Medial Moraine: Religious Dimensions
of American Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY L.J. 9, 10 (1990) (noting both Biblical and
Enlightenment elements in constitutional tradition).
58. Madison, supra note 49, at 68-69.
59. Smith, supra note 54, at 154-57.
60. Id. at 159-63; McConnell, supra note 36, at 169-70.
61. Smith, supra note 54, at 160.
62. Letter from James Madison to Edward Everett (1823), quoted in ANSON P.
STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 61 (rev. one-vol.
ed. 1964).
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because it would end the practice of imposing religious uniformity on
objectors and would save government from involving itself in and
worsening religious controversy.
Government, however, has become far more active now than in
the eighteenth century, and this activity affects many areas of life. As
a result, it is far more difficult to maintain religious freedom without
conscious governmental efforts to do so, efforts that themselves raise
concerns among some separationists and "Enlightenment"-minded
observers about government involvement with religion. Today,
neither of the two views can be taken to its logical extreme without
substantially suppressing the other in ways dangerous both to religion
and to civil society. What is needed is a regime that balances the two
views-what Reinhold Niebuhr would call a "proximate solution."
The remainder of this Article describes Niebuhr's thought and how it
might help us reach such a solution.
II. REINHOLD NIEBUHR ON ETHIcs, RELIGION, AND POLITICS
Reinhold Niebuhr's writings on ethics, religion, and politics
provide a perspective on the truth and limits of each of the above
ideas, as well as insights on balancing them. Niebuhr critiques the
arguments for a "Christian nation," but also the arguments, both
Enlightenment and evangelical, for strict separation of church and
state. In volume two of his most systematic work, The Nature and
Destiny of Man,63 Niebuhr himself sought to ground toleration in a
balance between competing theories-the "Renaissance" view (which
roughly corresponds to Enlightenment liberalism) and the "sectarian
Protestant" view (Niebuhr's term for the evangelical approach).' 4
Because Niebuhr's social ethics grew out of a practical engagement
with various political and social movements, this part discusses his life
before turning to his ethical theories and his views on religion and
politics.
A. Niebuhr's Life: Realism in the Service of Moral/Political Activism
Reinhold Niebuhr was born of German-speaking immigrants and
raised in the practices of a small ethnic religious denomination.
5
Nevertheless, throughout his life he drew deeply from the socially
63. 2 REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN: HuMAN DESTINY
(Scribner Library ed. 1964) (1943) [hereinafter NiEBUHR, HUMAN DESTINY]. Volume 1
of this work, subtitled Human Nature, was published in 1941.
64. Id at 220-43.
65. See Fox, supra note 8, at 4, 28.
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active, reformist tradition of America's mainline Protestants.66 As
a young pastor in Detroit (1915-28), he attacked Henry Ford's labor
policies -and worked in pacifist organizations.67 During the Great
Depression, he was a tireless activist for left-wing causes, twice
running for office as a Socialist.' After rejecting both pacifism and
Marxism, Niebuhr worked vigorously in 1939 and 1940 to strengthen
sentiment against Nazi Germany, 9 and later in the Cold War to
organize liberal opposition to Communism.70 In his waning years, he
lent his support to protests against the Vietnam war.7'
Niebuhr was distinctive, however, in that he set political activism
in the context of an increasingly sophisticated "realism" about the
nature of humans and society. The earliest source of his realism was
political-Marxist analyses of power. Niebuhr's first prominent book,
Moral Man and Immoral Society.' relied on Marx in levelling a
withering assault against various strains of political and religious
liberalism, which Niebuhr claimed had far too much confidence in the
possibility of improving society through education, through scientific
and empirical analysis.' or through "appeals to love, justice, good-
will and brotherhood."'74 Due to his own struggles with Henry Ford,
66. For discussion of the reformist tradition of nineteenth century Protestantism, see
ROBERT HANDY, A CHRISTIAN AMERICA: PROTESTANT HOPES AND HISTORICAL
REALrITEs (2d ed. 1985); MARTIN E. MARTY, RIGHTEOUS EMPIRE: THE PROTESTANT
EXPERIENCE IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1970); TIMOTHY L. SMITH, REVIVALISM AND SOCIAL
REFORM (1956).
67. See Fox, supra note 8, at 94-100.
68. Id. at 115-24, 133-36.
69. Id. at 167-92; see also, e.g., REINHOLD NIEBUHR, CHRISTIANrrY AND POWER
POLITICS 1-32 (1940) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, CHRISTIANITY AND POWER POLITICS]
(criticizing, in chapter entitled "Why the Christian Church is Not Pacifist," pacifist
opposition to aiding Britain against the Nazis).
70. Niebuhr also advised the State Department on resistance to Communism. See
Fox, supra note 8, at 228-47 (discussing Niebuhr's State Department work and his
leadership in Americans for Democratic Action).
71. Id. at 283-85.
72. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY: A STUDY IN
ETHICS AND POLTCS (Harper & Row 1987) (1932) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN].
73. Id. at 211-16. Here Niebuhr primarily attacked John Dewey and his followers.
See DANIEL F. RICE, REINHOLD NIEBUHR AND JOHN DEWEY: AN AMERICAN ODYSSEY
17-27 (1993).
74. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Blindness of Liberalism, RADICAL RELIGION 23 (Autumn
1936); cf Daniel D. Williams, Niebuhr and Liberalism, in REINHOLD NIEBUHR:" HIS
RELIGIOUS, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL THOUGHT 193,195-97 (Charles W. Kegley & Robert
W. Bretall eds., 1956) (arguing that Niebuhr overstated the naivety of early twentieth-
century reformers). For examples of Marx's attacks on "bourgeois" reason and "Utopian"
reforms, see KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 33-37
(Samuel Moore trans., 1992); id, at 14 (arguing that "[liaw, morality, religion, are to [the
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Niebuhr became convinced that self-interest and the will to power
were pervasive in human social behavior, especially the behavior of
social groups.' Socializing private property was necessary, he
argued, precisely because economic power would give way only to
"coercion," not to reason or moralizing.
The source of Niebuhr's "realism," however, soon turned more
theological. By the mid-1930s, he (and others) realized the danger in
the Marxist "pretension" that a single-minded pursuit of the interests
of the working class would produce a final form of justice for all.
76
He began to locate the roots of society's evils in the self rather than
in particular social conditions, thus casting doubt on the idea that any
political program could be an ultimate answer.' While remaining
committed to socialist policies, he anchored his analysis of human
nature in the doctrines of sin found in orthodox Christian writers such
as Paul, Augustine, Luther, and Pascal.7' It was Niebuhr's increasing
sense of the danger of "utopian" views that led him, by the 1940s, to
new political commitments-the critique of pacifism and a (qualified)
defense of Western democracy and welfare capitalism.79 By this
time, Niebuhr's ideas had begun to influence a coterie of
policymakers and academics, such as George Kennan, Hans Morgen-
proletarian] so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which lurk in ambush just as many
bourgeois interests").
75. "In every human group there is less reason to guide and to check impulse,... less
ability to comprehend the needs of others and therefore more unrestrained egoism than
the individuals, who compose the group, reveal in their personal relationships." NIEBUHR,
MORAL MAN, supra note 72, at xi-xii.
76. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, REFLECTIONS ON THE END OF AN ERA 243-44 (1934)
(warning that Communism produces "new and stronger centres of political power which
will be new occasions for and temptations to injustice").
77. Id.
78. See id. at ix (arguing simultaneously for "a more radical political orientation and
more conservative religious convictions"). Niebuhr's turn to classical Christian sources
culminated in 1941-43 in the two volumes of THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN, supra
note 63, on which this part focuses.
79. See, e.g., REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF
DARKNESS xiii, 41 (1944) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, CHILDREN OF LIGHT] (defending an
approach to democracy resting on a "realistic philosophical and religious basis" that
recognizes "the power of self-interest in human society without giving it moral jus-
tification"); NIEBUHR, CHRISTIANI=Y AND POWER POLITICS, supra note 69, at 6 (attacking
religious pacifists for believing that preaching "the law of love ... would have ...
softened" Hitler's demands--"a faith which no historic reality justifies"). In one of
Niebuhr's well-known aphorisms, "[m]an's capacity for justice makes democracy possible;
but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary." Id. at xiii.
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thau, and Arthur Schlesinger, all of whom were inclined toward
pragmatic but anti-Communist liberalism.'
Both realism and a sense of religious judgment, however, led
Niebuhr to temper his defense of America with critique. While
resisting Communism, he also warned "against the temptation of
claiming God too simply as the sanctifier" of the American way,
noting "[t]he ironic tendency of virtues to turn into vices when too
complacently relied upon."'" As Cold War nervousness gave way to
placidity and self-satisfaction in the mid-1950s, Niebuhr criticized
Americans' faith in democracy, material goods, psychological self-
fulfillment, and individualistic, complacent religion.' While main-
taining that America had achieved considerable social justice, he
tempered this with ongoing critiques of injustices in areas such as race
relations-where his early "realistic" analyses became an important
source of Martin Luther King Jr.'s civil rights strategies of nonviolent
resistancePs
For more than forty years, then, Niebuhr combined moral and
political activism with a realism borne out of both political and
theological insights. The realistic assessment of people and groups did
not lead to cynicism, but instead operated in the service of a more
80. See JUNE BINGHAM, COURAGE TO CHANGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LIFE
AND THOUGHT OF REINHOLD NIEBUHR 368 (1961) (quoting Kennan as calling Niebuhr
"the father of us all"); BROWN, supra note 8, at 243 nA9 (same); RICHARD H. ROVERE,
THE AMERICAN ESTABLISHMENT 13 (1962) (describing Niebuhr as America's "official
Establishment theologian").
81. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 173 (1952) [hereinafter
NIEBUHR, IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY].
82. See, e.g., REINHOLD NIEBUHR, PIOUS AND SECULAR AMERICA 13 (1958)
[hereinafter NIEBUHR, PIOUS AND SECULAR AMERICA] (criticizing Americans' "idolatry"
of economic efficiency for creating a "gadget-filled paradise suspended in a hell of
international insecurity"); Letter from Reinhold Niebuhr to Felix Frankfurter (May 26,
1960) (Felix Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress), reprinted in Daniel Rice, Felix
Frankfurter and Reinhold Niebuhr: 1940-1964, 1 J. L. & RELIGION 325, 410 (1983)
(protesting against "the smugness of the current piety").
83. In 1932, Niebuhr warned that Southern whites would not voluntarily end
segregation, identified Gandhian nonviolence as a "particularly strategic instrument for an
oppressed group which is hopelessly in the minority," and predicted that "[t]he
emancipation of the Negro race probably waits upon the adequate development of this
kind of social and political strategy." NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 72, at 252. King
encountered these passages in his seminary studies and was heavily influenced by their
account of power. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE
KING YEARS 1954-1963 84-87 (1988) (reporting that King "came to describe Niebuhr as
a prime influence upon his life, and Gandhian nonviolence as 'a Niebuhrian stratagem of
power' "); MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY
STORY 96-99 (1958) (noting Niebuhr's "great contribution" of refuting "false optimism"
about social progress).
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solid and successful activism.84 In the process, Niebuhr developed
a series of reflections on the interaction of morality, religion, and
politics that is highly instructive as we face issues arising from their
interaction today.
B. Niebuhr's Social Ethics
This section reviews several general themes in Niebuhr's ethical
theory that are foundational for his specific discussions of religion and
politics.
1. Partiality, Power, and the Limits of Morals and Reason in
Politics
The first theme in Niebuhr's overall social ethics is an emphasis
on a substantial, irreducible element of self-interest, partiality, and
power-seeking in human social behavior. As discussed above,
Niebuhr emphasized this in reaction to the overconfidence of early
twentieth-century liberals who believed love or rationality could
triumph over interest and power in social relations.
Niebuhr traced the tendency toward self-interest to a basic
tension in human beings. They exist on the one hand in "freedom":
They always have some capacity to envision greater progress and
justice and possess a corresponding sense of obligation to achieve such
goals. At the same time, humans are finite: Their visions of
achievement are always partial, conditioned by historical and social
location.' This tension makes humans "anxious" (in a term that
Niebuhr borrowed from existentialist philosopher Soren
Kierkegaard6 ) and ultimately produces what the Jewish and Chris-
tian religions call "sin."'  Insecure in our finitude, we seek to
84. John C. Bennett, Reinhold Niebuhr's Social Ethics, in REINHOLD NIEBUHR: His
RELIGIOUS, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 74, at 46, 50 (observing that
Niebuhr sought "to make way for such solutions of our problems as are possible by
clearing away the idealistic and utopian illusions which have flourished" among political
and religious activists).
85. 1 REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE NATURE AND DESTINY OF MAN: HUMAN NATURE
16 (Scribner Library ed. 1964) (1941) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, HUMAN NATURE]. Although
Niebuhr was attentive to the ways in which historical factors affect behavior, he argued
that the underlying pattern described in text recurs in various forms throughout history.
Id. at 4-31.
86. Id. at 181-83 (quoting SOREN KIERKEGAARD, DER BEGRIFF DER ANGST [THE
CONCEPT OF ANxIETY] 89 (1960)).
87. Id. at 182 (describing this "inevitable spiritual state" of human existence). Niebuhr
thus became especially known for his recovery of the theological notion of "original sin."
See ROBIN W. LOVIN, REINHOLD NIEBUHR AND CHmSTIAN REALISM 130 (1995).
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overcome it by asserting the absolute value of some particular idea,
activity, or status (race, nation, class, or religion). In so defying our
limits, we commit the sin of pride-the fundamental sin in Christian
theology, in Niebuhr's view-whether by absolutizing a particular
interest or vision ("idolatry") or by subordinating the interests of
others ("injustice").' In a variety of examples, Niebuhr showed how
the pervasiveness of pride had been revealed by the evils of the
twentieth century and by the ambiguity present even in efforts to
achieve good. For example, he pointed out how economic and
technological progress solved some social problems but created ever
more complex new problems, and how Marxism's quest for equality
through state power created the conditions for Stalin's reign of
terror.89 And though he supported strong resistance to Communism
in the Cold War, Niebuhr also reminded Americans that their self-
image of national "innocence" was, and always had been, an
unfounded pretension: Americans had exercised power in settling and
transforming the New World, and in the Cold War the resistance to
Communism involved the accumulation of nuclear weapons with an
unprecedented capacity to destroy.'
Because pride stems from the heart of human existence, in
Niebuhr's view, it is not tied uniquely to any particular group, idea,
or institution; if one occasion for self-assertion is overcome, another
88. NIEBUHR, HUMAN NATURE, supra note 85, at 164, 179. Feminist and other
liberation theologians charge that Niebuhr's condemnation of pride is appropriate only for
those who wield power, members of an oppressed group, on the other hand, need to assert
selfhood and may commit sin by failing to do so. See, e.g., JuDrrIH PLASKOW, SEX, SIN
AND GRACE: WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE AND THE THEOLOGIES OF REINHOLD NIEBUHR
AND PAUL TILLICH 62-73 (1980); Valerie Saiving Goldstein, The Human Situation: A
Feminine View, 40 J. RELIGION 100, 109 (1960). While this critique has some force, it
ultimately does not undermine Niebuhr's insights. First, Niebuhr continually warned that
persons "tempted by their eminence and... [their] undue power become more guilty of
pride and of injustice than those who lack power and position." NIEBUHR, HUMAN
NATURE, supra note 85, at 223. Second, while condemning pride, Niebuhr also spoke
directly to the oppressed in arguing that humans must assert responsibility and accept the
corresponding risk of guilt (indeed, the desire to avoid such risks and remain morally pure
can be another form of pride). See infra text accompanying note 104. Moreover, he
correctly warned that even a historically 6ppressed group, when it takes power, will be
subject to the temptations and ambiguities that come with exercising responsibility. See
e.g., NIEBUHR, CHILDREN OF LIGHT, supra note 79, at 110-13 (making this argument with
respect to the proletariat).
89. See REINHOLD NIEBUHR, AN INTERPRETATION OF CHRIMsTIAN ETHICS 97-98
(1935) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, CHRIsTIAN ETHICS]. As Niebuhr concluded, "[e]very human
advance offers new possibilities of catastrophe, and every virtue has the possibility of a
vicious aberration." Id. at 54.
90. NIEBUHR, IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 81, at 1-4, 31-35.
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will arise. For example, Niebuhr argued, Marxism unmasked the
bourgeois illusion that capitalism always rewards virtue and promotes
freedom, but replaced it with the new illusion that serving the
interests of the proletariat would produce justice and harmony
overall. 9' Moreover, the pervasiveness of self-interest and pride
cannot be overcome by appeals to morality and brotherhood, by
"rational suasion" and education, or by greater scientific knowledge;
modern history shows that "man may, in his freedom, violate, corrupt,
and prostitute the canons of reason in his own interest. '
Niebuhr thus stands with one foot in the stream of thought
running from Friedrich Nietzsche to postmodern philosophers such as
Michel Foucault and Richard Rorty. To one degree or another, all
of these thinkers "expos[e] reason as hubris" and "reason and
justification as tainted with rationalization," as a "strateg[y] of power
and domination, intended or otherwise."93 As historian John Patrick
Diggins has commented, "when we read contemporary poststruc-
91. NIEBUHR, CHILDREN OF LIGHT, supra note 79, at 106-18.
92. NEBUHR, HUMAN NATURE, supra note 85, at 112; see also id. at 110 (arguing that
science will never "achiev[e] the same results in the field of social relations which [it]
achieved in the mastery of nature").
Consistent with this outlook, Niebuhr generally rejected strong theories of a "natural
law" accessible to all rational beings, holding that such principles were too few and too
abstract to be of significant guidance. Since many arrangements held to be "natural" are
used and mystified by the dominant class-the aristocracy in a feudal system, the
bourgeoisie in a liberal system-they become further examples of "the force of sin in the
claim of sinlessness." NIEBUHR, HUMAN DESTINY, supra note 63, at 253-54.
93. JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, THE PROMISE OF PRAGMATISM: MODERNISM AND THE
CRuSIS OF KNOWLEDGE AND AUTHORrrY 436, 437 (1994); see also id. at 436 ("Niebuhr
was something of a poststructuralist before the term came into being").
Nietzsche, of course, assaulted the notion of objective rationality, asserting that "[t]he
entire knowledge-apparatus is ... directed not toward knowledge, but rather toward
getting control of things," and that "[t]his world is the will to power-and nothing besidesl"
FRIEDRICH NmTZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER (Walter Kaufmann ed., Walter Kaufmann
& R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1967), reprinted in NmTCHE: SELECTIONS 146, 151 (Richard
Schacht ed., 1993). Foucault likewise emphasized the role that power plays in the
interpretation of texts and practices, warning that "we should not imagine that the world
presents us with a legible face.... We must conceive discourse as a violence we do to
things." MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE DISCOURSE
ON LANGUAGE 229 (1972). Rorty, too, asserts that "[t]he Enlightenment idea of 'reason' "
has been discredited, as contemporary thought has "blurred the distinction between innate
rationality and the products of acculturation" and other influences. Richard Rorty, The
Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 257, 258
(Merrill D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988); see also id. at 267 (arguing that this
view leads to defending liberal democracy on pragmatic, historically based grounds rather
than "as the gradual unveiling, through the use of 'reason,' of 'principles' or 'rights' or
'values' ").
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turalists [such as Foucault and Rorty] we find what we earlier had
found in reading Niebuhr: finitude, contingency, opacity, and
irony."94 In Diggins's words, then, Niebuhr showed "why political
language that speaks of virtue and innocence can only be distrusted
as a sinful misuse of words, usually by members of the privileged
classes who mistake their power and wealth for 'moral excel-
lence.' )595
Niebuhr, however, derived most of his insights about pride from
premodern sources-the rich tradition of Jewish and Christian
rumination on the dark and mysterious character of human motives
and actions (from the Hebrew prophets through Paul, Augustine,
Luther, and Pascal).96 Niebuhr helped recover for the twentieth
century this Augustinian tradition of thought, with its emphasis on the
"evil" element in human nature that "threatens the human community
on every level."g He was, in one historian's words, able to "draw
upon [these] premodern thinkers and demonstrate their relevance to
the modem human condition., 98 Their emphasis on the persistence
of evil taught the lesson, above all, that "although reforms are
necessary and desirable, they can improve the conditions of men only
if they are undertaken in the spirit of humility."
In Niebuhr's view, the tradition of Augustinian or "prophetic
religion" (as he calls it), by teaching that "there is only one God,"
unmasks the "vanity and pride by which [man] imagines himself his
nations, his cultures, his civilizations to be divine."" Thus it
inculcates humility. Nevertheless, institutional religion (including
Judaism and Christianity) likewise can "become the vehicle of
collective egotism."'' Religion can be especially tempted to claim
false absolutes, since it deals with the one absolute: "Every truth can
94. DIGGINS, supra note 93, at 439.
95. Id. at 438 (citing NiEBuHR, MORAL MAN, supra note 72, at 1f3-41).
96. See Richard Kroner, The Historical Roots of Niebuhr's Thought, in REINHOLD
NIEBUHR: HIs RELIGIOUS, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL THOUGHT, supra note 74, at 185-89
(discussing Niebuhr in the light of these thinkers).
97. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, Augustine's Political Realism, in CHRISTIAN REALISM AND
POLITICAL PROBLEMS 119, 122 (1953) [hereinafter NIEBUHR, CHRISTIAN REALISM]
(discussing AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD).
98. DIGGINS, supra note 93, at 436; see also Kroner, supra note 96, at 189 ("The basic
Paulinism of [Niebuhr's] thought enables him to strike down the pretensions of modem
ideologies.").
99. Kroner, supra note 96, at 189.
100. NIEBUHR, HUMAN NATURE, supra note 85, at 137.
101. Id. at 217.
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be made the servant of sinful arrogance, including the prophetic truth
that all men fall short of the truth."' '
2. The Importance of Moral Values in Politics
For Niebuhr, however (perhaps unlike Nietzsche and some
postmodernists), the recognition of power and contingency in social
behavior did not call for cynicism or undermine efforts for justice.
Niebuhr's position did not imply the stance that there are no absolute
truths-only that there are fewer than people are temperamentally
inclined to think, and that there generally is no single easy way to
relate those truths to the complexities of life. Moreover, although
human freedom is dangerous because it often triggers prideful self-
assertions, that same freedom is also creative; indeed, it is a precon-
dition for justice and morality in the first place. It is precisely our
"uneasy conscience" over our unrealized moral possibilities, Niebuhr
said, that helps spur us on to higher moral achievements.'
3
We must not regard the forms and conditions of justice achieved
in history "as normative in the absolute sense," Niebuhr said, since
they necessarily involve some use of coercion and the attendant
element of prideful self-assertion. But
neither will we ease our conscience by seeking to escape
from involvement in them. We will know that we cannot
purge ourselves of the sin and guilt in which we are involved
by the moral ambiguities of politics without also disavowing
responsibility for the creative possibilities of justice." 4
For Niebuhr, the norm that continues to call humans to further
achievement is the law of agape: the demand to express sacrificial
102. 1& For example, leaders of the medieval Catholic Church grasped political and
economic power by claiming to be the "repository of a revelation which transcends the
finiteness and sinfulness of men." Id. While Reformation theology emphasized as its
fundamental tenet "the imperfect character of all human ambition and achievements," the
leading Reformers, Luther and Calvin, exalted the perfection of their own teachings to the
extent of imposing or advocating punishment, even death, for dissenters. See NIEBUHR,
HUMAN DESTINY, supra note 63, at 226-28.
103. See, e.g., NIEBUHR, HUMAN DESTINY, supra note 63, at 244 ("Man's freedom over
the limits of nature... means that no fixed limits can be placed upon either the purity or
the breadth of the brotherhood for which men strive in history."); id. at 117 (stating that
the human mind "cannot escape an uneasy conscience over its sinful effort to complete its
own life about 'itself and its own' ") (quoting Martin Luther).
104. Id. at 284; see also, e.g., Reinhold Niebuhr, The Christian Church in a Secular Age,
in THE ESSENTIAL REINHOLD NIEBHUR: SELEc ED ESSAYS AND ADDRESS 79, 86
(Robert McAfee Brown Ed., 1986) (warning that religious believers must not be "tempted
by their recognition of the sinfulness of human existence to disavow their own
responsibility for a tolerable justice in the world's affairs").
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love for all humans, even when they do not reciprocate. °5 In
Niebuhr's view, this norm is revealed in Jesus' teachings-for
example, " '[w]hosoever loseth his life shall find it' ""-as well as
in his death and atonement." Liberal theologians, Niebuhr said,
correctly recognized that
[t]he uneasy conscience of man over various forms of social
injustice, over slavery and war, is an expression of the
Christian feeling that history must move from the innocency
of Adam to the perfection of Christ .... For the freedom
of man makes it impossible to set any limits of race, sex, or
social condition upon the brotherhood which may be
achieved in history."
Because, however, liberal theologians failed to appreciate the
pervasiveness of human self-interest-in other words, the distance
between the ultimate and the human-they wrongly believed that the
norm of agape could be directly translated into social practice."°
Instead, the notions of universal love and brotherhood are supra-
rational; they are an " 'impossible possibility,' ""' a revelation of
the indeterminate possibilities that humans are called toward, but
never can reach, in history.
3. "Proximate Solutions" and Pragmatism
In Niebuhr's view, the facts of self-interest and partiality mean
that the task for politics must not be to seek utopia, but to pursue
more modest goals. Like other realms of culture, political activity (in
general or for any particular cause) can "add to the... richness of
our insights into reality," but "[i]f the effort is made to establish [it]
* . . as the clue to the meaning of the whole, the cultural pursuit
becomes involved in idolatry" and dangerous pretensions."'
Politics thus can only be, in Niebuhr's often-quoted words, a
"method of finding proximate solutions for insoluble problems.,"'
Politics seeks the "best possible harmony," that is, to direct people
and society as much as possible, "within the conditions created by
105. Id. at 71, 69 (defining agape as "disinterested and sacrificial" and not dependent
on whether it is mutually reciprocated).
106. Id. at 69 (citations omitted in original).
107. Id. at 74 (noting that Jesus' life "culminates in an act of self-abnegation").
108. Id. at 85.
109. See id. at 85-86.
110. Id. at 76 (citation omitted in original).
111. Id. at 209.
112. NIEBuHR, CHILDREN OF LIGHT, supra note 79, at 118.
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human egoism," toward the results that would follow from the norm
of sacrificial love."' Such "proximate solutions" must balance
power against power; given the inevitable element of self-interest in
the behavior of all social groups, an "equilibrium of power" is
necessary, requiring "conscious control and manipulation" by
society."4 Thus, the simple pursuit of "brotherhood" is misguided,
for "as soon as the life and interest of others than the agent are
involved in action or policy," a sacrificial attitude may "become an
unjust betrayal of their interests.""' 5 In seeking to manage self-
interest in this way, of course, Niebuhr's thought parallels important
themes in the thought of the framers, particularly James Madison's
arguments in the Federalist Papers supporting the Constitution's
devices for dividing and balancing power."6
Moreover, political actions must be recognized as relative rather
than final, lest they produce either the dangers of "optimistic illusions
or . .. the despair which follow[s] upon the dissipation of these
illusions.""' Niebuhr summarized: "Higher realizations of historic
justice would be possible if it were more fully understood that all such
realizations contain contradictions to, as well as approximations of,
the ideal of love."" 8
In his social ethics, then, Niebuhr ultimately settled on a form of
pragmatic liberalism "characterized by a rejection of all ideologically
consistent political schemes.""' 9 Because government must seek
113. NIEBUHR, HUMAN DEsTINY, supra note 63, at 252.
114. Id. at 266; see also id. at 258 (acknowledging that any countervailing power itself
"contain[s] possibilities of contradicting the law of brotherhood").
115. Id. at 88 (noting that "[flailure to understand this simple fact... has resulted in
the unholy alliance between Christian perfectionism and cowardly counsels of political
expediency in dealing with tyrants [such as Hitler] in our own day").
116. In addressing the "diseases" of popular government, Madison maintained that
"faction," the clash of opposing interests, is "sown in the nature of man," and cannot be
fully eliminated by reasoned dialogue because of "the connection ... between [man's]
reason and his self-love." THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), at 77, 78 (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). The solution, at least in significant part, must be to balance power in
the sorts of ways that the checks and balances provisions of the Constitution do:
"Ambition must be made to counteract ambition." THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James
Madison) at 322 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Because neither the citizens nor their rulers
are "angels," the policy must be to "suppl[y], by opposite and rival interests, the defect of
better motives." Id; see also JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 299 (1888)
(arguing that the Constitution "is the work of men who believed in original sin, and were
resolved to leave open for trangressors no door which they could possibly shut").
117. Reinhold Niebuhr, Ten Years That Shook My World, 56 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY
542, 545 (1939).
118. NIEBUHR, HuMAN DEsTINY, supra note 63, at 246-47.
119. STONE, supra note 8, at 205.
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proximate solutions, and because final moral norms seldom can be
reduced directly to practice in a social world marked by self-interest
and partiality, Niebuhr's political thought ultimately counsels a focus
on "what works." Moreover, Niebuhr came to mitigate his earlier
deprecation of the value of reason in politics: Even if reason, or
"critical intelligence,"'" cannot displace self-interest, it plays a
necessary role in managing it. "[T]o arbitrate and adjust between
competing interests" requires a "fresh examination" and "critical
scrutiny of all the interests involved," lest "shifting circumstances...
transmute the justice of yesterday into the injustice of tomorrow." ''
Nevertheless, Niebuhr's pragmatism was distinctive from other
varieties in two ways that make it useful for analyzing religion and
politics in today's context. First, it did not degenerate into accepting
politics as nothing more than a series of interest-group power
struggles. As discussed above," Niebuhr maintained the relevance
of both moral values and "critical intelligence" to political decisions.
This is important for present purposes because only a theory that sees
some role for moral principles in politics can give an account of how
religion has operated in American politics, and how it can operate in
a constructive way.
On the other hand, Niebuhr's thought was devoid of the sense of
this-worldly confidence in "critical intelligence"-empirical science,
economic theory, reasoned dialogue, or other sorts of
instruments-that has characterized much of American prag-
matism."z Niebuhr's Augustinian religious vision kept in focus the
ironic and even tragic elements in human striving. This, too, is an
important, distinctive contribution that a religiously sensibility can
make to politics and that any theory of religion and politics must take
into account.
4. The Organic Nature of Society
Niebuhr's mature work also overlapped with certain conservative
themes, particularly those in the thought of Edmund Burke.
Niebuhr's sense of the dangers of "ideologically consistent political
schemes" and the need for caution in social and political reforms was
reminiscent of Burke's criticism of the "abstract" doctrines of the
120. NIEBUHR, CHRIsTIAN ETHICS, supra note 89, at 100.
121. I&
122. See supra part II.B.2.
123. See DIGGINS, supra note 93, at 434-43.
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French Revolution. 24 Moreover, like Burke, Niebuhr came to
emphasize the "organic" nature of societies: Each society's course of
development is highly contingent on the society's particular history
and culture, and efforts at reform must take account of this fact if
they are to be successful."rs This point will be particularly relevant
to the question of whether strict separation of church and state is
possible in a society as historically and currently religious as is
America."
5. Niebuhr's Use of the "Prophetic Religious" Perspective on
History and Society
Niebuhr's ethical theories were permeated by insights from his
reading of the "prophetic" tradition in Judaism and Christianity. In
Niebuhr's view, "prophetic religion" plays a role in politics at several
levels. First, its tenets point to a certain disposition toward human
knowledge and striving. The believer in prophetic religion
understands that all human perspectives are limited and relative in the
face of the one God, yet also that human striving is meaningful
because absolute norms are revealed (albeit imperfectly) in the world.
That basic tension between the absolute and the finite, between
freedom and constraint, is not resolved in history. It is, however,
addressed by "grace"-a "divine mercy" that enables us to resign
ourselves to our limits, neither trying to overcome them through
idolizing some cause nor giving up on the quest for relative goodness
in history.27 As Niebuhr puts it, prophetic religion
understands the fragmentary and broken character of all
historic achievements and yet has confidence in their
meaning because it knows their completion to be in the
hands of a Divine Power, whose resources are greater than
124. See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, Reflections on the Revolution in France (1791), in 8
THE WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE 53, 88 (Paul Langford ed., 1989)
(arguing that violent course of French Revolution stemmed from its being based on
"extravagant and presumptuous speculations" about remaking society).
125. REw OLD NiEBUHR, The Foreign Policy of American Conservatism and
Liberalism, in CHRISTIAN REALISM, supra note 97, at 72 (warning against "abstract modes
of social engineering" and advocating caution "not to fall into worse forms of injustice in
the effort to eliminate old ones").
126. See infra part l.C.2.e. It should be emphasized that although Niebuhr was a
"conservative" in the sense just described, his was a conservatism without any great
reverence for the status quo or for the individualism common to much conservative
thought in America. See STONE, supra note 8, at 164-69; Bennett, supra note 84, at 99,
107-15.
127. NIEBUHR, HUMAN DESTiNY, supra note 63, at 114.
1594 [Vol. 73
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
those of men, and whose suffering love can overcome the
corruptions of man's achievements, without negating the
significance of his striving."
The realization that one is finite yet accepted breaks one's pride;
it thereby enables one to see the truth in other's views and simul-
taneously gives "a sense of gratitude in the experience of release from
self."' 29 This emphasis on obtaining spiritual resolution through
accepting one's limits rather than through directly seeking perfection
in conduct-on "justification by faith," not by "works"-has been
prominent throughout Christian thought, from Paul to Augustine to
Luther.130 Niebuhr restated the doctrine of "justification by faith"
in terms particularly directed at modem persons facing ethical and
political decisions.'
Second, "prophetic religion" operates in the cultural world, giving
an explanation of human nature and history. In Niebuhr's view, the
relevance of prophetic religion to social and political decisions is
shown-indeed, the truth of its statements is "validated"-"by proving
them to be the source of meaning for the seeming contradictions and
antinomies of life."' 2 Religious images and stories are particularly
able to do this because they capture the paradox, mystery, and irony
of life, elements not reducible to logical analysis. 33  For example,
Niebuhr argued, "prophetic religion" accounts for the paradoxes of
human nature far better than do various schools of modem thought,
correctly attributing a "higher stature" to humans than do purely
naturalistic theories, but also "taking a more serious view of [their]
evil" than do idealistic theories." As will be explored later,3 5
128. NIEBUHR, CHILDREN OF LIGHT, supra note 79, at 189-90.
129. NIEBUHR, HUMAN DESTINY, supra note 63, at 115.
130. For both historical and theological discussion, see ALISTER E. MCGRATH, JUS-
TIFICATION BY FAITH: WHAT IT MEANS FOR Us TODAY (1988).
131. In Niebuhr's account, the notion that justification comes through forgiveness rather
than through perfect conduct-that even those redeemed by God continue to commit
sin-reflects an appreciation of "the full seriousness of sin as a permanent factor in human
history." NIEBUHR, CHRISTIANITY AND POWER POLITICS, supra note 69, at 3. Thus,
prophetic religion has always correctly "regarded the problem of achieving justice in a
sinful world as a very difficult task." Id. at 4. Yet the assurance of forgiveness and of
divine aid means that such strivings for justice will be meaningful and can achieve some
progress.
132. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, Coherence, Incoherence, and Christian Faith, in CHRISTIAN
REALISM, supra note 97, at 185 (arguing that under alternatives to Christianity, human life
"is either given a too-simple meaning or falls into meaninglessness").
133. See id. at 184-85.
134. NIEBUHR, HUMAN NATURE, supra note 85, at 18.
135. See infra part III.A.
1995] 1595
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
this is an important model for how religious views can participate dis-
tinctively in political argumentation in a pluralistic society. In Daniel
Conkle's words, this model "does not reject America's commitment
to deliberative, dialogic decision-making," and yet it "offers a
genuinely non-secular source of truth, a source of transcendent
judgment."
136
C. Niebuhr on Religion and Politics
The following section applies Niebuhr's general insights on
human nature, ethics, and religion to the relation of religion and
politics. It organizes his arguments by addressing them to the various
perspectives on church-state relations presented in part I.
1. The Dangers of Religion in Politics
Recall that the first paragraph of Justice Blackmun's concurrence
in Lee v. Weisman presents what I have called the "Enlightenment"
argument for a strict separation of church and state.137 Religion, in
this picture, has a unique propensity to intolerance and to reliance on
irrational decree, both of which threaten the dialogue and rational
debate that alone can support politics in a pluralistic democratic
society.138 The government, therefore, must be kept strictly free of
religious influences.
To a significant extent, Niebuhr's insights confirm the potential
dangers of too close an alliance between religious and political power.
To that extent, Niebuhr's outlook affirms the concerns of the
Enlightenment. As already noted, Niebuhr had few illusions that the
religious grounding of a political movement would guarantee its
virtue.139  Religion promises, in principle, to inculcate humility
before the "ultimate," but in practice it often produces a new kind of
arrogance, "add[ing] an element of pretension to the natural self-
136. Conkle, supra note 12, at 21; see also Alan Richardson, Reinhold Niebuhr as
Apologist, in REINHOLD NIEBUHR: HIS RELIGIOUS, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL THOUGHT,
supra note 74, at 291, 293 (arguing that Niebuhr "led [many] to see that the insights of
Biblical faith have an existential relevance to their own condition and to the condition of
the society in which their lives are set").
137. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661-62 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text.
138. See Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2666 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Marshall, supra note
18, at 853.
139. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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righteousness of men"'--a phenomenon that can be dangerous
when allied with political power. Thus, "[r]eligious questions have
been a particularly fecund source of fanaticism and conflict," and
confining religion to the private sphere of the individual, the home,
and the church may produce a "gain in provisional toleration."''
Moreover, politics typically involves moral ambiguity, complex factual
situations, and the balancing of interests rather than the achievement
of easy or ultimate solutions; these facts suggest that religious
doctrines will seldom translate directly into political programs.
Because "a complacent religion can easily sanctify immediate ends by
claiming ultimate sanctities for them," Niebuhr agreed that "[i]n some
respects democracy requires a secular politics.' 42
Niebuhr's warnings should be remembered when society faces
attempts to wield government power to favor or impose specific
theological ideals. One need only reflect on recent killings of
abortion doctors and those around them and the endorsement of such
killings by some religious activists, 43 or on religiously driven
conflicts from Bosnia to the Middle East, to be reminded of the
continuing possibility of intolerance and violence that lurks within
religious zeal. In the minds of some believers, if a certain state of
affairs is so important as to be commanded by God's law, there must
be no constraints on the pursuit of that result. When government
with its powers of force adopts such a posture, the results can be
horrible, as history has shown from the Crusades to the Inquisition to
Ku Klux Klan-supported repression.' 44
Although the possible uses of governmental power for religious
coercion in America come in milder forms today, the danger of
intolerance still remains. Advocates such as the religious right's
David Barton, who call for America to be "Christian" in some official
sense-that is, with the laws giving official favoritism to Christianity
or theism as such' 4*--tend simply to ignore the harm that citizens
140. Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Faith and Political Controversy, 12 CHRISTIANITY &
CRIsIs 97, 98 (1952).
141. NIEBUHR, HUMAN DESTINY, supra note 63, at 238.
142. Reinhold Niebuhr, Prayer and Religious Observances at Political Gatherings, THE
LUTHERAN, Aug. 6, 1952, at 12.
143. See 2 Die in Abortion Clinic Violence, C-n. TRIB., Dec. 31,1994, § 1, at 1; Abortion
Doctor and Bodyguard Slain in Florida, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1994, at Al.
144. See JAMES A. HAUGHT, HOLY HORRORS: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF
RELIGIOUS MURDER AND MADNESS (1990) (cataloging these and other examples of
religiously motivated persecutions).
145. See supra part I.A.3.
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who are non-believers would suffer if such proposals succeeded. They
also overestimate the gains from such official favoritism, and they
ignore or underestimate the extent to which a religious position in
politics can be colored by the self-interest, the will-to-power, of the
person asserting it.
2. The Inadequacy of a Secularized Public Order
The potential dangers of religion in politics, however, constitute
only one side of the story. Niebuhr's insights also suggest that secular
ideals can be similarly dangerous, and that religion can make valuable
and necessary contributions to the public order as well. Thus his
insights also challenge the ideals of the Enlightenment and incor-
porate various aspects of "evangelical" approaches to religious
freedom and church and state. The varying roles that religious and
secular ideals can play in public life make it unwise to invoke
secularity and "rational debate' ' 4 6 as the sole guides to political
decisionmaking. The effort to resist all religious influences on public
life, Niebuhr strongly warned, amounts to a dogma of "secularism"
that carries its own dangers. Such concerns led Niebuhr to be
suspicious of the notion of "separation of church and state" as a rule
for all church-state questions, 47 and to support many kinds of
government action accommodating the religious practices of groups
and individuals."4
a. The Secular State's Lack of "Neutrality"
The secularist view of church and state has relied heavily on the
"neutrality" thesis of modem liberalism: that in a pluralistic society,
the government must be neutral between competing or disputed
conceptions of the good.'49 The government must be strictly
146. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2666 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
147. See, e.g., Reinhold Niebuhr, Church and State in America, CHRISTIANITY & CRISIS
Dec. 15, 1941, at 1, 1 (criticizing an "absolute separation" under which religion is
"regarded as purely a private matter").
148. For examples, see infra notes 157-60, 178-80, 192-94 and accompanying text
(discussing Niebuhr's support for "release time" programs and aid to children attending
religious schools). See also RICHARD E. MORGAN, THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS
CONFLICT- CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA 66 (1968) (calling Niebuhr and like-minded
colleagues "one of the most important accommodationist groups" favoring some aid to
religiously affiliated schools).
149. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 11
(1980) (arguing for proposition that in political decisionmaking, no citizen may assert "that
his conception of the good is better than that asserted by any of his fellow citizens"); cf.
MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN
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secular, then, because for it to reflect any disputed religious view in
its actions would depart from the requirement of neutrality.
This concept of "neutral" politics has been thoroughly debunked
recently on the ground that it is both "impossibly restrictive" and
actually non-neutral between beliefs (those that are shared and those
that are disputed).150  Reinhold Niebuhr, however, did such
debunking more than a generation ago. Well before today's
postmodernists, Niebuhr attacked the liberals of his time who believed
in the existence of shared, neutral standards of reason that could solve
social problems.' In Niebuhr's Augustinian view, reason itself
often serves as "the instrument of the ego in advancing its claims
against another."' 2
There are several factors that, in practical terms, turn a simply
secular government into one that is a non-neutral engine of the
secularization of society. 3 One obvious cause is an increase in the
scope of government activity, particularly in the cultural and
educational areas that overlap with the activities and teachings of
religious communities. As Professor Michael McConnell has pointed
out,
when the First Amendment was proposed and ratified, the
government had little or no involvement in education, social
welfare, or the formation and transmission of culture. These
functions were predominantly left to the private sphere, and
within the private sphere religious institutions played a
leading role. As the government has assumed wider and
wider responsibility for the funding and regulation of these
functions, the idea of a "secular state" has become more and
AMERICAN PoLrIcs 8-28, 29 (1991) (describing and criticizing arguments that "disputed
beliefs about human good should play no or at most a marginal role in political
justification").
150. PERRY, supra note 149, at 8-28 (criticizing ideal of neutrality from politically liberal
perspective); see also Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral
Ideals After All, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1350, 1358-70 (1991) (same); David M. Smolin,
Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a Postmodern America: A Response to
Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REv. 1067,1074-83 (1991) (reviewing PERRY, supra note 149,
and arguing that rule of neutrality discriminates against views of traditionalist religious
believers).
151. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
152. NmBuHR, HUMAN DESTINY, supra note 63, at 260.
153. The actively secularizing government is non-neutral in both of the senses that have
been distinguished by Professor Douglas Laycock: It treats religion less favorably than
secular ideas (thus violating "formal" neutrality), and it has the effect of discouraging
religious belief and practice (thus violating "substantive" neutrality). See Douglas
Laycock, Forma4 Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL
L. REV. 993, 1001-06 (1990).
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more ominous. When the state is the dominant influence in
the culture, a "secular state" becomes equivalent to a secular
culture.'- 4
As McConnell suggests, one possible means of returning government
to a more nearly "neutral" position is to decrease its activity
overall. 55 Niebuhr, however, did not vigorously explore that line
of thought. He was a welfare-state liberal who always believed in the
necessity and importance of collective action in education, welfare,
and the economy.56
Niebuhr focused on a second factor that magnifies the
government's secularizing influence: the rigidity with which the
government promotes its own comprehensive views and prevents or
discourages efforts to allow religious views to flourish as competitors.
Niebuhr set forth his views on this matter in an article criticizing
McCollum v. Board of Education,"' in which the Supreme Court
invalidated a public school's "release time" program that excused
students to attend religious classes on school premises. Niebuhr
argued that special provision of time for students who wished to go
to religious classes was justified because several "modern secular
surrogates for historic religious faiths"-particularly the modern
confidence in democracy and the "American way"-"have a free
course in our public schools. Being only implicitly and not explicitly
religious they need not worry about the 'wall of separation.' ,,"'8 He
made the same complaint in a private letter to Justice Felix
Frankfurter, a close friend but also an indefatigable champion of a
strictly secular public school system. Niebuhr wrote:
154. McConnell, supra note 36, at 177.
155. See id at 177-81; cf Richard A. Epstein, Religious Liberty in the Welfare State, 31
WM. & MARY L. REV. 375,398-99 (1990) (arguing that "[t]he religious liberty of the free
exercise clause and the equal treatment [between religion and other activities] of the
establishment clause ... cannot [simultaneously] be preserved" unless government
regulation is scaled back across the board).
156. See Fox, supra note 8, at 297. As I argue infra in part III.B.3, our current
situation necessitates that we consider, more than Niebuhr did, reducing government's role
as direct provider of services in some areas, while perhaps maintaining its role in giving
funding and in setting general program constraints.
157. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
158. Reinhold Niebuhr, Editorial Notes, CHRISTIANITY & CRISIS, Mar. 29, 1948, at 34
[hereinafter Niebuhr, Editorial Notes]. Shortly after McCollum, Niebuhr helped organize
and draft a "Statement on Church and State," signed by a number of mainline Protestant
leaders, which charged that by disapproving "forms of cooperation between church and
state that have been taken for granted by the American people," the Court "will greatly
accelerate the trend toward the secularization of our culture." Statement on Church and
State (June 17, 1948), reprinted in 26 FIRST THINGS 32, 32 (Oct. 1992).
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I am convinced that the prevailing philosophy which is
pumped into our public schools day after day is itself a
religion, and I think a very erroneous one. It preaches the
redemption of man by historical development and by the
illusory "scientific objectivity." It does not have to worry
about the separation of church and state.
159
The same concerns about the "ideology" of public schools led
Niebuhr in the early 1950s to support some forms of government aid
to children attending religious (at the time, mostly Catholic)
schools."6  Moreover, at first he even opposed the Court's in-
validation of government-composed school prayers in Engel v.
Vitale," a ruling applauded by many liberal Protestants. 62 In a
controversial article, he warned that the school prayer ruling might
"work so consistently in the direction of a secularization of the school
system as to amount to the suppression of religion and to give the
impression that the government must be anti-religion."'63
159. Letter from Reinhold Niebuhr to Felix Frankfurter (March 31, 1948) (Felix
Frankfurter Collection, Library of Congress), reprinted in Daniel Rice, Felix Frankfurter
and Reinhold Niebuhr: 1940-1964, 1 J. L. & RELIGION 325, 346 (1983). On the long-
running Niebuhr-Frankfurter correspondence, see id. at 325.
John Bennett, a close professional colleague of Niebuhr's and also an adherent of
Niebuhr's "Christian realism," also defended the release-time accommodation, arguing that
"advocates of secularism as a view of life in place of the historical religions fail to
understand this claim that there is injury or unfairness or deprivation of freedom because
schools which have no place for religion favor in practice freedom for their [secular] faith."
JOHN C. BENNETr, CHRISTIANS AND THE STATE 233-34 (1958).
160. See, e.g., Reinhold Niebuhr, Protestants, Catholics, and Secularists on the School
Issue, in ESSAYS IN APPLIED CHRISTIANITY 253 (D.B. Robertson ed., 1959) [hereinafter
Niebuhr, School Issue]. The grants to children at issue at the time were for purposes such
as books and transportation. Like almost all Protestants, though, Niebuhr did oppose full
funding provided directly to the schools themselves. Id.
161. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
162. The leading journal of liberal Protestantism, The Christian Century, called Engel
"a service of the greatest importance to true religion as well as to the integrity of a
democratic state." Editorial, Prayer Still Legal in Public Schools, 79 THE CHRISTIAN
CENTURY 832, 833 (1962).
163. The Regents' Prayer Decision, 22 CHRISTIANITY & CRISIS 125, 125 (1962). As
such, Niebuhr would likely have had some sympathy with the claim pressed by
fundamentalist parents that the public schools teach an established religion of "secular
humanism." See Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684, 690 (11th Cir. 1987)
(rejecting that claim). As I will discuss, however, the relief the parents sought in that
lawsuit-banning of many books and ideas from the curriculum-is unworkable. Rather,
the only ways to achieve an attainable degree of neutrality in government's provision of
education are to allow students to "opt out" from objectionable curricula where possible
and to provide assistance to parents who choose a religiously informed education. See
infra part II.B.
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Within two years, Niebuhr retracted his opposition to the school
prayer decision, concluding that the diversity of religious symbols in
pluralistic America was such that "common public religious observan-
ces become practically impossible."'" Significantly, however, he still
warned that "[c]ompletely secularized education involves the danger
of a completely secularized culture,"' 65 and he never regarded such
secularization as "neutral." Niebuhr remained suspicious of a
secularized public order, even though he had come to regard certain
solutions, such as government-led prayers, as coercive and un-
workable. The concerns that animated Niebuhr have not gone away.
Public schools continue today to promote various moral views-as
inevitably they must. Such views, from multiculturalism to
Americanism to laissez-faire capitalism to "safe sex," inevitably
compete with religious views to give guidance on moral and social
issues.
Even if a totally secularized public order is not neutral as to
religion, however, it could be defended on the basis that the secular
should be privileged over the religious, either because the secular is
more likely to lead to political truth or because it is less likely to
threaten public peace. Such arguments constitute the crux of Justice
Blackmun's first argument in Lee v. Weisman.166 But they cannot
be sustained. Indeed, Niebuhr argued in volume two of The Nature
and Destiny of Man that secularism alone is an inadequate basis for
public order because it is too prone to fall into one of two unaccep-
table extremes-cynicism or fanaticism.
b. The Danger of Secular Cynicism
As noted above,67 Niebuhr argued that politics must maintain
an element of moral perspective on immediate decisions, transcending
mere self-interest, and that some such transcendence is possible
because of humans' (admittedly limited) freedom. For this task,
though, a purely secular public order is likely to be inadequate. "In
so far as modern tolerance has been achieved by disavowing religion,"
Niebuhr warned, "it may rest merely on indifference towards the
ultimate problems of life and history, with which religion is con-
164. Reinhold Niebuhr, Prayer and Justice in School and Nation, 24 CHRISTIANrrY &
CRISIS 93, 95 (1964).
165. Id.
166. See 112 S. Ct. at 2666 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also supra notes 23-25 and
accompanying text.
167. See supra part lI.B.2.
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cerned."'6' A toleration that is based on simply avoiding dispute
over deeply held views is only a step away from "[c]omplete
skepticism" and the loss of any sense of truth or ideals in politics:
"Skepticism thus becomes the forerunner of cynicism.'
'1 69
Surely this warning is highly relevant to American politics today.
Writing in the 1940s, Niebuhr noted that Americans historically had
erred toward overconfidence rather than cynicism because our vast
resources made social problems "seem[ ] so much more soluble."'170
In the last thirty years, however, public cynicism has grown markedly.
Theologian Robin Lovin has suggested that today's society has
imbibed too much unadulterated realism about politics and needs to
balance it, as Niebuhr did, with a healthy measure of idealism about
achieving greater relative justice as a society.'7' Large numbers of
citizens, disillusioned by Vietnam, Watergate, the intractability of
economic and social problems, and the prevalence of naked interest-
group politics, have lost all commitment to the political process.
172
Religious citizens have suffered such disaffection as well, an attitude
that can only grow worse if religion is confined to the margins of
public life.
173
c. The Danger of Secular Intolerance
On the other hand, Niebuhr argued, secularism as much as
religion can lead to what he called "new fanaticisms."'74 Because
pride is a pervasive fact of social behavior, it can "insinuate[ ] new
and false ultimates into views of life which are ostensibly merely
provisional and pragmatic."'  Thus, when secularists "sigh and
hope for the destruction [or privatization] of religion as the only way
of emancipating mankind from fanaticism," they fail to "understand
168. NIEBUHR, HUMAN DESTINY, supra note 63, at 238.
169. Id. at 239.
170. N[EBUHR, CHILDREN OF LIGHT, supra note 79, at 133.
171. Robin W. Lovin, Niebuhr at 100: Realism for New Realities, 109 THE CHRISTIAN
CENTURY 604, 605 (1992).
172. DIONNE, supra note 5, at 332-35 (discussing Americans' disgust with politics and
loss of "all sense of the public good").
173. See, e.g., FREDERICK M. GEDICKS & ROGER HENDRIX, CHOOSING THE DREAM:
THE FUTURE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 21-33 (1991) (arguing that
marginalizing values of religious citizens will destabilize America); David M. Smolin, The
Jurisprudence of Privacy in a Splintered Supreme Court, 75 MARO. L. REV. 975, 1065
(1992) (warning that traditionalist religious groups will suffer "profound" disaffection from
American society if their perspectives are deemed inadmissible in debates over areas such
as family and abortion).
174. NIEBUHR, HUMAN DESTINY, supra note 63, at 220.
175. 1& at 238.
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that they are dealing with a more fundamental problem than anything
created by this or that religion"; rather, "the problem of the relative
and the absolute in history" is common to all viewpoints. 76 For
these reasons, a Niebuhrian perspective vigorously questions the claim
by Justice Blackmun in Weisman that through a public square stripped
of religious influences we can substantially achieve dialogue,
deliberation, and rational debate.'
Indeed, Niebuhr worried that the barring of religion creates a
space in public moral discussion that easily can be filled by more
dangerous alternatives. Writing of the results of the "absolute
separation" theory he saw in the McCollum "release time" case,'78
he warned that into the "spiritual vacuum" left by the deliberate
severing of religion from any connection with education, " 'seven
devils more evil than the first' can easily rush.' 179 These words rang
strong and true to readers who had just seen Stalinist terror and Nazi
genocide; recent history had dramatically shown the capacity for
tyranny in secular ideals such as nation, race, and class.
Niebuhr's warnings, however, are still relevant today, as Richard
John Neuhaus has pointed out in writiig of the dangers of the "naked
public square."' 0 While today's secular causes obviously are mild
compared to the mid-century's totalitarian movements, they never-
theless have their intolerant aspects (sometimes lampooned in
discussions of "political correctness"). Such intolerance is often
trained against the free exercise of religions that controvert the
secular ideal toward which the cause is directed. Advocates of gay
and lesbian rights and women's rights, for example, try to force
conservative churches to hire gay or female ministers against their
religious tenets, whether through application of antidiscrimination
laws or through the revocation of tax-exempt status. 181  In even
176. Id. at 220.
177. See Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2666 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
178. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
179. Niebuhr, Editorial Notes, supra note 158, at 34.
180. See RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THm NAKED PuBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 80 (1984) ("When recognizable religion is excluded, the vacuum
will be filled by ersatz religion, by religion bootlegged into public space under other
names."). Neuhaus warns that the empty public square can lead to inordinate faith in
political ideologies (whether left or right), in technology, or in material fulfillment, as well
as to "the relativization of all values." Id. at 82-89.
181. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 19, at 484-85 (arguing for the withdrawal of tax
exemptions from religious organizations that exclude women from positions of leadership);
see also Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., Hostility to Religion, American Style, 42 DEPAUL L. REV.
263, 285-90 (1992) (discussing, among other things, physical attacks by some gay rights
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broader fashion, Professor Mary Becker argues that because "religion
perpetuates and reinforces women's subordination, and religious
freedom impedes reform," the First Amendment's religion clauses
should "be interpreted or amended to minimize their counter-
majoritarian effect"'-that is, we should simply eliminate'the
principle of religious freedom against state power.
Nothing in this discussion is meant to question the justice or the
importance of laws protecting women and homosexuals against
discrimination in employment or services in the broader society. But
we should remember Niebuhrian insights. The tendency of activists
is to seek to use the government to pursue their cause into all sectors
of life, even-perhaps especially-into those communities that harbor
contrary moral and conscientious visions. If a plurality of schemes of
meaning is to be preserved in 'society, laws must affirmatively protect
conscience against government encroachments; power must be
balanced with power."
Religion particularly presents a counterbalance to the coercive
power of the state, a point of resistance to the ideals the state seeks
to impose. For Niebuhr, "prophetic religion" reinforces the limited
nature of government; the state is "subject to divine judgment and
wrath" whenever it "preten[ds] that its power is perfectly vir-
tuous."'' " Indeed, Niebuhr argues, "there is finally no other vantage
point, other than the religious one, from which to judge the self-
deification of nations."'" This is because prophetic religion
emphasizes the true dimension of the individual, as having
his ultimate authority and fulfillment above the political
community and the social process in which he is involved.
Without this emphasis man is easily debased into a mere
instrument of a social or political process and is left power-
less to defy the majesties of the world with a rigorous: "We
must obey God rather than man."'
86
groups on churches and church services).
182. Becker, supra note 19, at 459.
183. See supra notes 114-16 and accompanying text.
184. NIEBUHR, HuMAN DFSTiNY, supra note 63, at 269. Simultaneously, Niebuhr
argues, prophetic religion inculcates a respect for the proper functions of government in
achieving order and justice. Ld.
185. Niebuhr, Church and State in America, supra note 147, at 2 (emphasis added).
186. Niebuhr, School Issue, supra note 160, at 254. Similar understandings of religious
freedom are set forth in CARTER, supra note 1, at 272-73, and McConnell, supra note 36,
at 167-69 (emphasizing connection between theological foundations for religious freedom
and "more general" theory of "limited government").
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In Niebuhr's view, then, the presence of religious convictions among
the people-their allegiance to a higher authority as they understand
it-thus becomes a powerful testimony to the limited nature of
government. By respecting those allegiances, the state acknowledges
its limits. On this score, Niebuhr's religiously based understanding of
the limited nature of government tracks closely the "evangelical" view
of the basis for religious freedom. Both accounts emphasize
government's limited role in matters of conscience because such
matters are prior to, and of greater importance than, the limited
functions of the state.
d. Religion and Humility in Politics
Niebuhr also emphasized that religion should play a role in public
life because certain religious attitudes can provide a crucial missing
dimension of humility and grace. People who know they are limited
yet forgiven have a resource to see beyond their own perspectives to
understand and be forgiving even of their opponents. Niebuhr wrote
that "[o]ne of the great resources of [prophetic] faith for social
achievement is the sense of humility which must result from the
recognition of our common sinfulness":"8
To subject human righteousness to the righteousness of God
is to realise [sic] the imperfection of all our perfections, the
taint of interest in all our virtues, and the natural limitations
of all our ideals. Men who are thus prompted to humility
may differ in their ideals; but they will know themselves one
in the fact that they must differ.... To subordinate the
righteousness to which they are devoted under the righteous-
ness of God does not mean to be less loyal to any cause to
which conscience prompts them. Yet they will know that
they are finite and sinful men, contending against others who
are equally finite and equally sinful."
Of course, Niebuhr recognized, religion often fails to inculcate
such humility in political actors and instead produces its own strains
of arrogance. Nevertheless, I think he would argue, the resources that
religion offers for inspiring humility in political debate should caution
against embracing secularist conceptions of the public order: In
throwing out religion altogether, we may throw out the baby
187. REINHOLD NIEBUHR ON POLrrCS 207 (Harry R. Davis and Robert C. Good eds.,
1960) (citation omitted).
188. Reinhold Niebuhr, Zeal Without Knowledge, in BEYOND TRAGEDY: ESSAYS ON
THE CHRISnAN INTERPRETATION OF ISTORY 246-47 (1937).
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(humility) with the bathwater (arrogance). Niebuhr went so far as to
claim that religion-that is, prophetic religion-was better suited than
other modes of thought to produce such humility while avoiding
cynicism, for prophetic religion gave the best explanation of why
human action in history is imperfect and yet meaningful. For present
purposes, it is not necessary to assert that the kind of religion Niebuhr
described gives the best answer to these questions, only that it gives
an important answer that should be considered. Moreover, as the
next subsection will discuss, religion is too pervasive a factor in the
lives of Americans to base a theory on the hope or premise that it will
go away or retreat to the margins of life. Instead, we must encourage
those aspects of religion that produce humility and discourage those
that produce arrogance and coercion.
e. Religion and the Organic Nature of Society
A final argument prominent in Niebuhr's work is that
secularization of the public order goes hopelessly against the grain in
any society, such as America, in which religion plays an important
role in the lives of the people. Niebuhr's increasingly Burkean,
"organic" understanding of society emphasizes that government must
arise from the people, from their concrete, historic patterns."9 It
cannot be based on imposing an abstract and ideologically consistent
scheme-in this case, the rigid separation of religion from public
moral reasoning-in the name of liberal philosophy (or the "culture
of liberal democracy," as Professor Sullivan puts itl). Given the
incurably religious character of the American people, schemes that try
to maintain a wholly secular "civil moral order"'' inevitably will
fail. Rather, the solution must lie ultimately in encouraging those
aspects of religion that are productive in politics, while speaking out
against those aspects that are destructive.
Niebuhr sounded this theme in his critique of the McCollum'92
decision. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence had supported the
invalidation of the "release time" program on the ground that public
schools "serve as perhaps the most powerful agency for promoting
cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic people" and therefore
"must be kept scrupulously free from entanglement in the strife of
189. See supra part lI.B.4.
190. See Sullivan, supra note 28, at 199-200.
191. Id. at 199.
192. Illinois ex reL McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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sects."'93 Niebuhr, in his editorial, accused the Court of "trying to
preserve our unity at the expense of the vitality of our culture" and
asked: "Can we have community only by emptying our culture of all
its differences or by pretending that actual differences do not exist?
Does community not require that we come to terms with each other
despite our differences?"' 94
As already noted, however, Niebuhr was no arch-
traditionalist. 95 His recognition of the extent of human freedom to
reason and to change existing arrangements would doubtless lead him
to agree with Justice Holmes that "[iut is revolting to have no better
reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV."' 96 Thus, for him, pointing to the actual importance of
religion in society did not entail endorsing every way in which religion
enters public discussion. The search, once again, must be for
"proximate" solutions that mediate between humans' boundedness to
traditions and communities and their capacity for reason and change.
f. Conclusion
This section and the previous one suggest that Niebuhr sought to
maintain a balance in appreciating the social values and dangers of
both secularism and religion. Leaders of mainline Protestantism who
followed him often chose not to maintain such a balance. Moved by
the contribution of secular groups to causes such as civil rights, and
incensed by the failure of so many churches to stand against injustice,
theologians and leaders in the 1960s embraced "the secular city"
wholeheartedly and called on the churches to look to "the world" for
guidance in defining their mission."l This Article obviously is not
the place to discuss whether such "secular" or highly assimilated
theologies were an accurate rendering of Christianity. As Daniel
Conkle has pointed out, however, such secularized views are not
particularly helpful contributors to a theory of religion and politics
193. Id. at 216-17.
194. Niebuhr, Editorial Notes, supra note 158, at 34.
195. See supra notes 65-84 and accompanying text.
196. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
197. See, e.g., HARVEY Cox, THE SECULAR CITY 91-129 (1965). For discussions of the
rise of "secular theology" out of civil rights activism, see JAMES F. FINDLAY, JR., CHURCH
PEOPLE IN THE STRUGGLE: THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES AND THE BLACK
FREEDOM MOVEMENT 30-32 (1993); ELIZABETH MENSCH & ALAN FREEMAN, THE
POLITICS OF VIRTUE: IS ABORTION DEBATABLE? 83-97 (1993); Thomas C. Berg,
"Proclaiming Together"? Convergence and Divergence in Protestant Views of Evangelism,
1945-1967, 5 RELIGION & AM. CULTURE 49, 64-66 (1995).
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because they do not suggest any distinctive role for religion: They
tend to reduce it to secular goals and interests.198
To Niebuhr, secularism also had its dangers, and religion its
distinctive contributions; government-fueled secularization of society
was therefore objectionable. As described below, however, his
writings suggest that he would see the answer to that problem not in
government-directed religious exercises, but in making accom-
modations within the confines of government programs or institutions
for the independent religious activity of groups and individuals.' 9
3. The Inadequacy of Keeping Religion "Pure"
The final church-state theory that Niebuhr's writings critique is
the evangelical argument for a strict separation of church and state.
The argument, in the words of Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Lee
v. Weisman, is that "[r]eligion flourishes in greater purity, without...
the aid of Government."'  As already noted, this theme has a
substantial history in America, beginning with Roger Williams and
finding considerable expression in the thought of the founding period.
As with the arguments previously discussed, however, Niebuhr
suggests approaching this perspective with caution.
Of course, as we have seen, Niebuhr strongly emphasized the
need for religions to take a critical, prophetic stance toward
government.20 ' To preserve this stance, he argued, some sort of
distancing is needed-not merely the minimal separation of church
and state into two institutions, but something more. Shortly before
his death, Niebuhr published a passionate article attacking Richard
Nixon's institution of weekly White House chapel services, charging
that they established a "tamed religion" at war with the prophetic
traditions of Judaism and Christianity.2 2 Reflecting the influence
of evangelical separationism, Niebuhr argued that the disestablishment
of religion "[b]y implication ... encouraged the prophetic radical
198. Conkle, supra note 12, at 20-21.
199. See infra part III.B.
200. 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2666 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
201. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
202. Reinhold Niebuhr, The King's Chapel and the King's Court, 29 CHRISTIANITY &
CRisis 211, 212 (1969). Niebuhr quoted his favorite Hebrew prophet, Amos, on the
primacy of social justice over pious ritual: "I hate, I despise your feasts, [God says,] and
I take no delight in your solemn assemblies.... But let justice roll down like waters, and
righteousness like an ever-flowing stream." Id. (quoting Amos 5:21-24).
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aspect of religious life, which insisted on criticizing any defective and
unjust social order.'"2"
Once again, however, this point must be balanced against other
Niebuhrian insights that illuminate the nature of religion and politics.
As noted above,' one of Niebuhr's central themes was that an
active, responsible religion cannot be entirely "pure"; justice in history
can be maintained only by "pressures and counter pressures."
Moreover, as Niebuhr pointed out, a separation that counts religion
too pure to influence the unseemly world of politics is at odds with
American history and culture, which have always witnessed religious
involvement in political causes, from the American Revolution to
abolition to prohibition to the civil rights and anti-war
movements.205
Despite this history, the fact that the religion clauses were
partially founded in sectarian evangelical Protestantism has made our
understanding of religious freedom susceptible to unqualified rhetoric
about the church's need to be separate from the "corruption" of the
world. That stance worked as long as the general culture was heavily
influenced by evangelical morality: The evangelicals could rely on
the implicit connection between religion and government while
denying the need for any explicit connection. As the general culture
became more secularized, however, more and more evangelicals
rejected the notion of separation altogether. Distinctive religious
involvement in politics came to be seen as necessary for the religion
as strong secular forces cut in the opposite direction. Moreover, even
during the heyday of evangelical influence, religious leaders applied
the call for purity and separation in selective fashion. For example,
for decades much of conservative Protestantism organized politically
against certain identified sins-particularly the drinking of al-
cohol-but avoided involvement in other social issues, such as
attacking racial oppression, on the ground of holding to the "pure
saving gospel." 2" Niebuhr's insights into the necessity of accepting
203. Id. at 211.
204. See supra notes 104, 112-14 and accompanying text.
205. See Niebuhr, Church and State in America, supra note 147, at 1. For a brief
summary of religious involvement in American politics, see Michael E. Smith, Religious
Activism: The Historical Record, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1087 (1986).
206. See MARTY, supra note 66, at 213 ("Though individualistic Protestants were
constantly criticizing liberal efforts to remake the world through law, they were eager to
do so themselves on [the drinking] issue."). Compare also how the Rev. Jerry Falwell, in
later years a conservative political activist, attacked Dr. Martin Luther King in a 1965
sermon for "mixing religion and politics":
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responsibility offer a powerful critique of that tendency to pretend
that one can remain aloof from political involvement without thereby
supporting the status quo and any injustices that it reflects.
III. "PROXIMATE SOLUTIONS": RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGION
A Niebuhrian approach appreciates the problems in a
government that is sanctified, but also in one that is secularized. As
the previous section shows, Niebuhr critiqued both Enlightenment and
evangelical views of tolerance ("Renaissance" and "sectarian," in his
terminology) and sought to balance those competing forces. Likewise,
this part will argue, a solution that takes into account both Enlighten-
ment and religious insights will produce the best "proximate solution"
to the problem of religious freedom in America. Such a balance of
power is necessary to reflect the combination of Enlightenment and
evangelical views that inspired the struggle for religious freedom in
the founding period. The balance is also necessary because, left on
its own, each view tends to treat its own perspective as absolutely
valid and ignore that of the other. As Niebuhr wrote, "neither piety
nor enlightenment [is] as simply the guarantor[ ] of either private
goodness or public virtue as the proponents of each side con-
tend." At the same time, "each side possesse[s] more common
virtue than the opponent [i]s willing to admit."2"8  Neither side,
secularism nor religion, on its own can provide sufficient support for
religious freedom in a pluralistic society.
On the one hand, uncritical secularist arguments, such as those
of Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Lee v. Weisman," assume that
secular political activism will be rational and tolerant and that the
discordant and repressive elements are introduced only by religion.
As a result, they believe it necessary to insulate public life from the
pressures of religious activity. This, as already noted, allows for
[Our] message is designed to go right to the heart of man and there meet his
deep spiritual need. Nowhere are we commissioned to reform the externals ....
Believing the Bible as I do, I would find it impossible to stop preaching the pure
saving gospel of Jesus Christ, and begin doing anything else-including fighting
Communism, or participating in civil-rights reforms.
Rev. Jerry Falwell, Ministers and Marchers, Sermon (1965), quoted in FRANCES
FITZGERALD, CITIES ON A HILL: A JOURNEY THROUGH CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
CULTURES 129 (1986).
207. NIEBUHR, PIOUS AND SECULAR AMERICA, supra note 82, at 5.
208. Id.
209. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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secular orthodoxies to use the law to suppress religiously based
dissent, in violation of the free exercise of religion.210
On the other hand, there are reasons to be skeptical that
evangelical or other religiously based theories alone can provide
adequate support for religious freedom. Throughout history, the
tendency of religiously based accounts has been to grant toleration to
similar views and then to deny it to others. As Niebuhr noted, the
sixteenth-century reformers, Luther and Calvin, ignored the demands
for humility implicit in their own religious insights and pushed for
dissenters to be persecuted' Likewise, Niebuhr pointed out, the
Puritan faction in seventeenth-century England "pled for liberty of
conscience when it was itself in danger of persecution; and threatened
all other denominations with suppression when it had the authority to
do so. ',212 In America, of course, it is a familiar story that the
Puritans who came seeking their own religious freedom immediately
denied it to others. Even after official disestablishment, as noted
above, American authorities put in place a range of preferences for
generic Protestantism, despite the supposed Protestant commitment
to "soul liberty" and to the exemption of religious concerns from the
cognizance of government.21' It has always proved difficult for
religious persons to see the practices familiar to them as anything
other than "natural" and necessary to public order.
Still today, some Americans repeat the pattern of ignoring or
underestimating the harm done to dissenters from explicit government
advancement of pariticular religious truths. For example, it is fair to
say, as does Professor Douglas Laycock, that many of those who
advocate government-initiated religious displays and rituals, when
they could use nongovernmental outlets for such expression, simply
"place little or no value on the costs to religious minorities., 214 A
certain Enlightenment-based distrust of religious triumphalism is
necessary to remind us of that fact.
In short, a Niebuhrian perspective shares some features of the
Enlightenment: the concern that politicized religion will often lack
humility or concern for the views of other citizens; and the hope that
citizens can to some extent put aside differences over ultimate matters
to reach practical solutions to immediate problems. But in the
210. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text.
211. NIEBUHR, HUMAN DESTINY, supra note 63, at 226-31.
212. Id. at 227.
213. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
214. Laycock, supra note 3, at 844. For further discussion, see infra part III.B.1.
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Niebuhrian perspective, it is d1so arrogant and dangerous to believe
that secular philosophies can provide the sole basis for public action,
without permitting any contribution from the insights of religion.
Thus toleration and religious freedom should not mean government
hostility or indifference to religion, but rather the preservation of a
domain of conscience. In these ways, a Niebuhrian perspective tracks
evangelical views on church and state. To the extent a Niebuhrian
view regards government as limited in its sphere-to the extent it
objects to the efforts to realize either secular or religious utopias
through the state-it is consistent with both Enlightenment and
evangelical views.
What does this approach suggest in terms of specific doctrine and
results in religion clauses cases? It should be acknowledged that a
Niebuhrian perspective does not translate directly or simply into legal
rules concerning church-state relations. To some extent, of course,
the difficulty of articulating such rules is faced by every analyst of
church and state in modem America. While the Enlightenment and
evangelical views may have coalesced around religious freedom under
a regime of generally limited government, they are much harder to
reconcile in a time of activist government, when preserving religious
freedom requires more specific attention from government, and
creates tensions with the Enlightenment model of a secular state.
In addition, however, the Niebuhrian emphasis on ambiguity,
paradox, and the wisdom in competing perspectives makes it difficult
to translate his insights simply into specific principles for action.
Critics of Niebuhr have seen this as a defect in his ethical thought
generally. One religious ethicist, for example, has complained that
Niebuhr "prefer[red] to maintain a dialectical tension between" the
basic demands of love and justice, and never "spell[ed] out any
second-order principles which might follow from" those core con-
cepts.215 Another argues that after Niebuhr rejected Marxism, he
failed to articulate a new "critical social theory" that would guide the
choices between conflicting political ideologies; instead, he constructed
"not much more than a 'dispositional ethic' for politicians and social
activists. ,211 In other words, Niebuhr beautifully taught activistshow to combine vigorous advocacy with deep humility, but left little
215. RiCHARD HIGGINSON, DILEMMAS: A CHRISTIAN APPROACH TO MORAL
DECISION MAKING 109 (1988).
216. DENNIS P. MCCANN, CHRISTIAN REALISM AND LIBERATION THEOLOGY:
PRACTICAL THEOLOGIES IN CREATIVE CONFLICT 80, 102-03 (1981).
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guidance (other than context-specific judgments) on what actual goals
they should seek.
As I will argue later, there is tremendous value simply in this
"dispositional ethic" for combining advocacy and humility, but
Niebuhr's work also helps in developing second-order solutions for
problems such as religion and politics. Above all, Niebuhr helps us
face the fact that for a problem as deep as the relation between
religion and politics, any actual solution must necessarily be
"proximate" rather than ultimate. Principles of action for a social
problem should respond to the basic concerns that underlie and define
the problem, but as responses they will always be imperfect.
To recapitulate, the basic problem of religious freedom today is
that a government strictly separate from all religious influences, while
perhaps tolerable when that government's role is limited, becomes a
strong force for secularization and a threat to free exercise of religion
when the government's role is active and pervasive. The challenge is
to avoid such secularizing pressures without sanctifying the
government or allowing it to intrude on citizens' ultimate commit-
ments.
The best legal regime for keeping government free of both
religious arrogance and secular arrogance is to allow freedom and
pluralism in religious matters rather than to pursue either
government-sponsored religion or a secularized civil order. This
solution works out in different ways for different areas of church-state
interaction. With respect to religious participation in the making of
secular laws, it welcomes such religious involvement, rejecting the
Enlightenment pretension that religion has little positive to contribute.
But a Niebuhrian view also sees the need for activists to remain
humble and to retain a sense of the limits of government's ability to
achieve ultimate solutions; thus it calls on both religious and secular
activists to make efforts to present their political arguments in terms
to which other citizens can relate.
With respect to other areas of church-state relations, a Niebuhr-
ian viewpoint recognizes government-fueled secularism as a significant
problem, but sees that it is inappropriate for government to respond
to this problem by promoting religion itself. The better solution is for
government to accommodate the independent religious decisions and
activities of individuals and groups by protecting such activities from
secular laws that impinge on conscience, and by permitting religiously
affiliated institutions that provide education or social services to
participate in publicly funded programs in those areas.
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A. Religious Participation in Lawmaking
All of Niebuhr's work, in a sense, is about the relation between
morality, religion, and politics. Not surprisingly, then, the current
church-state issue to which his work speaks most directly is the debate
over the role of religion in politics-whether there should be any
constraints on the role that religious beliefs may play in political
decisions and the enactment of laws.
Despite a recent outpouring of scholarship on this question, for
the most part no serious constitutional issues have been raised in
litigation. As one part of the longstanding Lemon v. Kurtzman test
for Establishment Clause violations, the Supreme Court has stated
that laws lacking a "secular purpose" are unconstitutional.2 Under
this test, however, the Court has approved of significant religious
involvement in laws limiting abortion.218 Elsewhere the Court has
recognized that "[a]dherents of particular faiths and individual
churches frequently take strong positions on public issues including
... vigorous advocacy of legal or constitutional positions. Of course,
churches as much as secular bodies and private citizens have that
right." ' The statutes that the Court has actually invalidated under
the "secular purpose" prong have involved promotion of distinctively
religious materials or rituals, usually in the sensitive context of the
public schools.'
As a first cut, then, the Court's "secular purpose" requirement
prevents government from acting with the purpose of affecting the
facially religious domain of "theology, worship, and ritual." ' By
contrast, it allows substantial religious influences on the formation of
policy in the facially secular domains with which government policy
is typically concerned. Since the Court's holding specifically ap-
proving religious involvement in politics came in the area of abor-
217. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
218. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,303-04 (1980) (rejecting claim that refusal of public
funding for abortions "established" Roman Catholic tenets against abortion).
219. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,670 (1970); see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
618, 641 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Religionists no less than members of any other
group enjoy the full measure of protection afforded speech, association, and political
activity generally.").
220. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987) (finding unconstitutional
a law requiring the teaching of "scientific creationism" if evolution is taught); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,61 (1985) (invalidating law requiring "moment of silence" at beginning
of school day); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 43 (1980) (striking down law requiring the
posting of the Ten Commandments in classrooms).
221. Laycock, supra note 48, at 381.
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tion-an issue almost uniquely controversial-there is no doubt that,
as a constitutional matter, religious beliefs and arguments may serve
as a basis for lawmaking on other secular policy issues such as the
economy, foreign affairs, poverty, or environmentalism.
Some scholarship about the relation of religion and politics
accepts this sharp distinction between direct government advancement
of religion and the advancement of secular policies based on religious
beliefs.' Taken at its sharpest, the distinction would mean that no
religious belief, however dogmatic or eccentric, should be disqualified
from political debate and action in the secular domain simply on the
ground of its dogmatism or eccentricity; it should be addressed on its
merits, like all other beliefs. Many scholars have so argued.23
A number of scholars, however, contend that the reliance on
religious beliefs in the making of laws and policies in the secular
domain is unconstitutional, or at least inconsistent with the premises
of liberal democracy in a pluralistic society where citizens of all faiths,
and no faith, are regarded as equals. Some scholars take this position
with respect to all religious beliefs. 4  Others would treat some
religious views as legitimate participants but exclude those views that
are "sectarian" and "authoritarian," z that are "non-dialogic" and
222. See Daniel 0. Conkle, God Loveth Adverbs, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 339,345 (1992)
(distinguishing between "worldly" and "spiritual" matters); Franklin I. Gamwell, Religion
and Reason in American Politics, 2 J.L. & RELIGION 325, 334 (1984) (distinguishing
between "explicit activities of the state" and "the implicit religious ideal by which the laws
are properly informed"); Smolin, supra note 150, at 1088-89 (distinguishing between
"temporal" and "ultimate" peace).
223. Michael J. Perry, Religious Morality and Political Choice: Further Thoughts-and
Second Thoughts-on Love and Power, 30 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 703 passim (1993); Sanford
Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2061, 2077-78
(1992) (reviewing PERRY, supra note 149); Smolin, supra note 150, at 1094-103 (same).
224. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 149, at 352-55; Robert Audi, Separation of
Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 259, 274-86
(1989); Edward B. Foley, Political Liberalism and Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 43
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 963 passim (1993). Professor Kent Greenawalt also argues that
religious arguments generally should not serve as the public basis for legislation, although
he allows that they may serve as the private basis for a legislator's or voter's decision-
making when secular bases provide no determinate answer. KENT GREENAWALT,
RELIGIOUS CONVICrIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 12 (1988).
225. PERRY, supra note 149, at 106. See generally id. at 83-122 (arguing that to merit
consideration, beliefs should be articulated in terms that have "public accessibility"). Perry
has since changed his position and invited all religious beliefs into public debate. See
Perry, supra note 223, at 713.
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not open to "question, reconsideration, or debate, '96 or that refuse
to "submit to rational review. '
Niebuhr's reflections on the nature and interaction of religion and
politics provide strong support for the distinction between facially
religious matters and facially secular matters, and for the participation
of religious views in deciding secular matters. For a variety of reasons
set forth in the following section of this Article, s government must
avoid involvement in religious matters and must confine its activity to
temporal concerns. Government's sphere, Niebuhr would argue, is
limited to seeking and promoting proximate solutions to the problems
of life, not the ultimate solutions that are the subject of the des-
tinctively religious domain. On those matters, government should
leave decisions up to the people as individuals and groups.
With respect to temporal or secular policy areas, however,
Niebuhr's insights strongly counter the arguments of those who would
bar religious visions and arguments from serving as bases for political
decisions. The whole array of Niebuhrian themes presented in part
IIH9 shows that such a blanket exclusion is indefensible and impos-
sible, on grounds of both principle and prudence.
While political decisionmaking, in a Niebuhrian view, generally
must be directed at proximate rather than ultimate goals, "ultimates"
also must affect the calculus. Otherwise, the political enterprise too
easily degenerates into cynicism. When ultimates and moral questions
are part of the consideration of a political issue, that issue cannot be
settled solely by empirical inquiry or "critical intelligence." As Kent
Greenawalt argues, secular reasons are "radically inconclusive" as to
many questions of policy; they "cannot straightforwardly resolve the
political questions involved in [for example] abortion, animal rights
and environmental policy.""0  Once the debate is open to various
value systems, there is no good reason to exclude religious systems as
contributors. To maintain the kind of balance between ideals and
reality that Niebuhr showed was necessary, religious views must be
able to affect policy along with secular ideals.
226. Daniel 0. Conkle, Religious Purpose, Inerrancy, and the Establishment Clause, 67
IND. L.J. 1, 10-11 (1991).
227. Gamwell, supra note 222, at 341.
228. See infra parts III.B.
229. See supra part II.C.2.
230. GREENAWALT, supra note 224, at 147, 148. Greenawalt actually speaks of
"publicly accessible" reasons as being so limited, but since he (wrongly) assumes that only
secular reasons can be publicly accessible, the terminology in text is justified.
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Niebuhr's own work exemplifies how religion can contribute
distinctive insights into human character and action in ways highly
useful for political decisionmaking. To give just one example, his
discussions of capitalism and socialism address both the call to
equality that comes from the transcendent "law of love" and the
necessities that arise from the religiously grounded recognition of
pervasive human imperfection. The former imposes the obligation "to
organize the common life so that the neighbour will have fair
opportunities to maintain his life"; but the latter compels recognition
of the need for some "special rewards as inducements to diligence,"
and some "differentials in privilege.., to make the performance of
certain social functions possible."'" These considerations, Niebuhr
eventually concluded, pointed generally toward some form of a mixed
economy or welfare-state capitalism. One need not agree with his
precise analysis of economic systems to recognize the importance both
of asserting ideals and respecting limits on the means by which they
can be accomplished. In Niebuhr's hands, moreover, the prophetic
religious viewpoint offers the resources not only to recognize such a
tension between ideals and reality, but also the resources to accept
the tension. History may not be perfectible, but it is meaningful"3
Practically speaking, moreover, Niebuhr's "organic" outlook tells us
that religious contributions cannot be excluded from the project of
politics in America, for they form the base of moral convictions for
so large a part of the population.
Despite these contributions, it might be argued that by legislating
on a secular matter on the basis of a religious belief, the government
essentially has enforced conformance to that religious belief.
Moreover, such compulsion is equal to or greater than that which
occurs when the government conducts or sponsors a religious ritual,
such as prayer in public schools, and forces citizens to participate in
that ceremony. 3  There are immense differences between the two
cases, however. Religious citizens and groups are seriously mar-
ginalized if their views are excluded from any influence on
policymaking, much more seriously than if they are prevented from
having government conduct their preferred religious rituals. As will
be discussed below,' there are considerable outlets for religious
231. NIEBUHR, CHRISTIAN ETHIcS, supra note 89, at 65.
232. See supra part IH.B.5.
233. See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE
L.J. 1611, 1630 & n.64 (1993).
234. See infra part III.B.1.
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expression besides government ceremonies. But in a complex modem
society, a social goal-that, is, the realization of a vision of jus-
tice-can often be accomplished far more effectively, or perhaps
solely, through government action."
A more difficult question is presented if we ask whether some
religious views should be seen as improper for public debate and as
support for laws, because they make relatively little contribution or
they pose dangers that outweigh their benefits. Proposals in this area
generally have focused on beliefs that are "sectarian," "authoritarian,"
or not "publicly accessible.",1 6  The paradigm evil against which
these proposals are directed, perhaps, is the flat assertion that some
coercive law should be imposed solely because some religiously
defined authority-God, the Pope, or the Bible-says so.
Niebuhrian insights do suggest that society should be deeply
concerned about political activists who simply assert their own visions
in dogmatic fashion, making no effort to present arguments in terms
accessible to other citizens. Consequently, it is legitimate to express
moral condemnation of such arguments. Take the hotly debated issue
of abortion as an example. If an anti-abortion activist argues in the
public arena that abortion should be made illegal simply because
God's law forbids it, such an argument may legitimately be criticized
on the basis that (apart from whether the position is correct or not)
it makes no effort to speak in terms that citizens who do not accept
God's law can understand.
The Niebuhrian reasons for this moral objection have to do with
the need for humility in politics-a goal that, I have argued, is
properly supported by both Enlightenment and religious values. 7
Niebuhr reminds us that politics is not the place for achieving ultimate
goals; it is in substantial part a matter of compromise, a search for
proximate solutions to insoluble problems. Accordingly, Niebuhr
235. As Professor Laycock puts the distinction:
Questions of morality, of right conduct, of proper treatment of our fellow
humans, are questions to which both church and state have historically spoken.
They are questions within the jurisdiction of both. . . . [O]n matters of
governmental policy, somebody has to rule. This polity has decided that it should
be the majority, but it must inevitably be someone. The government must make
decisions on political matters.
In the case of religion, no one has to rule. There is no need for the
government to make decisions about Christian rituals versus Jewish rituals versus
no rituals at all.
Laycock, supra note 48, at 379-80, 381; see also Conkle, supra note 222, at 345-46.
236. See, e.g., the proposals discussed supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 187-89, 207-14 and accompanying text.
1995] 1619
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
affirmed the importance of the secular in politics, including the
pragmatic use of reasoning ("critical intelligence") to balance
conflicting goals that cannot all be realized perfectly. He also deeply
distrusted the "true believer," religious or secular, who would accept
no such constraints on the ability to realize a vision through
politics. 38
Asking citizens and activists to present their political arguments
in accessible rather than authoritarian terms does not guarantee that
those persons will maintain a great degree of humility in their political
activity, but it certainly points in that direction. It is very likely that
an activist who refuses to pursue goals in terms accessible to his
fellow citizens is "claiming ultimate sanctities for" such goals, with the
attendant dangers that follow: a lack of sympathy and toleration for
the situation of others. 39 The refusal even to address the perspec-
tive of one's opponents, or of the persons who may be affected by a
coercive law, evidences such a lack of sympathy. Such dogmatism
simply multiplies the anger and division that already inevitably exist
between persons of differing political views.
Moreover, it is not too much to ask as a matter of political
morality that citizens in the political arena present arguments in
accessible terms. As Professor Michael Perry, who once advocated
the "public accessibility" standard, has argued, it is not unfairly
burdensome to ask citizens speaking to the broader public to live up
to this ideal.2' As I would define the ideal, most religiously based
arguments that are typically made in the public arena would satisfy it.
Some proponents of politically active religion claim that making one's
arguments in such form will too easily lead to abandoning one's
religious distinctives and capitulating to the premises of secular
culture. Professor David Smolin has echoed this complaint, asserting
that the demand for public accessibility in political discussion
"requires [traditionalist] religious believers to enter into a dialogue
with a willingness to renounce their most cherished religious
beliefs."24 But if the concept of public accessibility is understood
238. Fox, supra note 8, at 335-36.
239. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
240. See PERRY, supia note 149, at 116.
241. Smolin, supra note 150, at 1075. What Professor Smolin is specifically concerned
with in making this change is a slightly different demand: that religious believers accept
that their beliefs may be fallible and should be revised in the light of other beliefs in a
pluralistic society. Later on, however, he asserts that the two demands really are the same,
and both objectionable: "If... 'public accessibility' forbids the claim that God, or God's
revelation, supports a position, then the requirement of public accessibility is substantially
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broadly, this objection should dissolve; Reinhold Niebuhr's own life
and work provide an example of why. Niebuhr offered religious
arguments that were "publicly accessible" in the sense that they
addressed religious concepts such as sin and grace to the concerns of
society and politics, in the form of arguments to which other citizens
could relate and productively respond. Indeed, Niebuhr's arguments
were illuminating to many outside the Christian faith.242 Yet
Niebuhr explained and defended such concepts in a way that severely
critiqued the dominant religious and political culture of his time, the
culture of liberal optimism.243
There is little reason to doubt that most traditionalist Christians
could articulate "publicly accessible" arguments for the wisdom of the
policies they support.24  Most traditionalist Christians affirm to
some degree the possibility of "apologetics," that is, the rational
defense of their faith to those outside it. 45 If rational arguments
can be made to defend (successfully or not) the central beliefs of the
faith, then there seems every reason to suppose that arguments can
be made to defend moral and political positions stemming from such
beliefs.
In most cases, a citizen should make such arguments in the form
of a "positive apologetic": that is, the citizen accepts the premises of
her opponents and seeks to argue for the superiority of her own
position.2 Again, consider the example of abortion. A religiously
motivated opponent of abortion might argue for the full personhood
of the fetus by reference to commonly accepted scientific facts such
as the presence of full genetic information from conception, or the
presence of brain waves early in fetal development.2 47 Or the
equivalent to the [unacceptable] requirements of fallibilism and pluralism." Id. at 1086.
242. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
244. Whether those arguments would be convincing to others is, of course, another
question.
245. An example of such a work by conservative Protestants is R. C. SPROUL ET AL.,
CLASSICAL APOLOGETICS: A RATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH (1984); see
also PAUL GRIFFITHS, AN APOLOGY FOR APOLOGETICS: A STUDY IN THE LOGIC OF
INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE 1-3 (1991) (defending, from a more liberal religious
perspective, the necessity for believers of one religion to engage in apologetics with those
of different religions).
246. See, e.g., GRIFFITHS, supra note 245, at 15 (stating that apologetics "usually uses
only methods of argumentation and criteria of knowledge acceptable to the adversary").
247. See, e.g., FRANCIS J. BECKWITH & NORMAN L. GEISLER, MATrERS OF LIFE AND
DEATH: CALM ANSwERS TO TOUGH QUESTIONS ABOUT ABORTION AND EUTHANASIA
21, 22 (1991) (making both such arguments); David M. Smolin, Why Abortion Rights Are
Not Justified By Reference to Gender Equality: A Response to Professor Tribe, 23 J.
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abortion opponent can bring the fetus within the ambit of society's
general commitment to the powerless, the voiceless, and the
stranger.2 s That commitment, as one such argument points out, is,
"in part, historically rooted in the great stories of the Biblical
tradition"249 such as the Good Samaritan; there is every reason for
the abortion opponent to use such stories to support his claim that
abortion violates that fundamental commitment. But to present the
stories as compelling on their own terms is a far cry from a dogmatic
assertion that abortion is wrong because God forbids it.
In the foregoing examples, the arguments seek to appeal to a
standard that citizens on the other side of the debate accept. In most
cases, this kind of apologetic is preferable in politics; by presenting
arguments based on premises others can accept, the citizen respects
the limits of her own perspective and the goodness and truth in those
of others. But the requirement of a "publicly accessible" apologetic
need not require that a citizen always argue on the basis of the
premises of her opponent. In some cases-perhaps including
abortion-the issue may be so foundational that it implicates
differences in the most basic premises. In such cases, the citizen may
also give a "negative apologetic"; she may endeavor to show that the
premises on which her opponents rely are incoherent and that her
own premises are the only ones that make it possible to reach an
answer. This sort of argument will be especially attractive to religious
believers who doubt the value of secular reason as a sufficient source
of truth, and who wish to maintain the distinctiveness of religious
premises in argument without having to "translate" those premises
entirely into secular terms." My argument here suggests that
MARSHALL L. REV. 621, 656 (1990) (reviewing LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE
CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990), and noting that brain waves have been measured within 40
days of conception).
248. See, e.g., GEORGE WEIGEL, CATHOLICISM AND THE RENEWAL OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 132-34 (1989) (arguing that "the abortion liberty is at fundamental cross-
purposes with America's founding instincts-instincts which once created a welcoming and
hospitable culture" in matters such as immigration). As Perry notes, the primary
arguments against abortion made by the nation's Roman Catholic bishops appeal to the
same commitment to value the lives of other humans. PERRY, supra note 149, at 117-18.
249. WEIGEL, supra note 248, at 134.
250. "Negative apologetics" as defined in the text will be especially attractive to those
religious believers-primarily some conservative Protestants-who adhere to a
"presuppositional" method of defending their beliefs. In the presuppositional approach,
the religious believer seeks to show that the effort to ground thought in humans'
autonomous capacities, rather than in God, is incoherent because human characteristics
provide no basis for any sort of objective truth; thus one must begin with the presup-
position that God exists and should be followed. See, e.g., CORNELIUS VAN TIL, THE
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citizens may proceed on such terms in political debate, but they must
argue why their religious premises are superior.
Niebuhr made this sort of argument repeatedly. He asserted that
other forms of thought besides "prophetic religion" could not explain
how human existence could be so partial and limited, and yet at the
same time so meaningful.?1 In particular, he repeatedly assaulted
the premise that humans' natural capacities to reason and act morally
were sufficient to solve social problems. This "negative apologetic"
speaks to the position of other citizens, yet it does not require that
the person making the apologetic accept the premises on which other
citizens proceed. It is open to the religious believer to try to show (if
possible) the incoherence of other systems of thought, and thereby
negatively validate her religiously based approach. To return to the
example of abortion, some religious opponents of abortion argue that
once society abandons the premise that all human beings are made in
the image of God, and thus have a divinely conferred intrinsic worth,
there is no basis for any kind of human rights; social policy becomes
a question of who has brute power to determine which forms of life
deserve protection. 2  There are many kinds of responses to that
argument-from questioning the degree of respect for human dignity
that so-called Christian societies manifest, to suggesting ways in which
human dignity can be firmly founded under other systems. But the
anti-abortionists' argument is publicly accessible, raising challenges
that other citizens can understand and to which they can respond.
The above standards place some restrictions on the kind of
arguments that should be deemed morally acceptable in political
debate. But it is important to realize that they must be applied to
secular arguments as well as religious ones. A Marxist who simply
assumes the correctness of Marxist premises without arguing for them,
or a defender of abortion rights who simply assumes that the fetus
lacks any rights, likewise can be condemned for failing to engage in
the argument in a fashion that shows humility and sympathy for the
other side.
Finally, that highly sectarian political arguments are disfavored
should not be .translated into a constitutional rule disabling such
DEFENSE OF THE FAITH 99-105 (3d ed. 1967) (discussing reasoning by presupposition).
251. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., C. EVERET KOOP & FRANCIS A. SCHAEFFER, WHATEVER HAPPENED
TO THE HUMAN RACE? 6 (1979) (arguing that once society removes the teaching that
"man is made in the image of God and therefore is unique,.. . there is no adequate basis
for treating people well").
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arguments from serving as the basis for legislation (by striking down
legislation that rests on them). The distinction between "sectarian"
arguments and "publicly accessible" arguments is an ideal to which
society can point to raise moral objections against divisive rhetoric,
but it is too hazy to serve as a standard that can be administered by
courts.253 The quality of public accessibility is a matter of degree.
Niebuhr's writings remind us that there is some partiality in all
perspectives on society and politics, even in those that speak in a
broadly accepted language; partiality is certainly not limited to those
who speak from religious perspectives2 4
A regime in which all views are admitted into public debate must
rest, ultimately, on the capacity of the people to practice humility and
embrace tolerance. In a religious nation such as America, such
virtues will have to emerge from religious viewpoints as much as from
Enlightenment secularism. Here Reinhold Niebuhr provides the final
contribution to be discussed in this Article: an argument for
toleration and humility arising from central Christian doctrines that
assert that even those who are redeemed continue to fall prey to pride
and self-aggrandizement. The Niebuhrian view asks the political
activist (religious or secular) not to renounce his most basic views, but
to be aware of several complicating factors: his own limits, the
difficulty in applying general religious truths to complex real-world
problems, and the potential good and truth in the views of his
opponents. The Conclusion turns to this final point.
B. Other Church-State Issues
Niebuhr wrote less systematically about other church-state issues
than he did about the role of religion in politics. Any discussion of
the implications of his work for these other issues, therefore, must be
more tentative, resting heavily on extrapolation from general themes.
253. As such, even if public accessibility were an ideal found in the Constitution, it
might be seen as a "political question," inappropriate for enforcement by courts, because
of a lack of "judicially manageable standards." See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962).
254. Moreover, pragmatic factors undercut the necessity and advisability of actual legal
rules restricting government action based on "sectarian" arguments. The need for actual
rules is reduced because in a pluralistic society, a religious activist will have strong practical
reasons to make political arguments that are persuasive to others, not simply to those in
her faith community. See Mark Tushnet, The Limits of the Involvement of Religion in the
Body Politic, in THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY 191, 207-08
(James E. Wood & Derek Davis eds., 1991). Moreover, suppressing religious involvement
through actual legal bars is likely to create as much anger and disaffection as is saved. See
supra note 173 and accompanying text.
1624 [Vol. 73
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
Nevertheless, Niebuhr's work does point toward certain proximate
solutions to problems of religious freedom in America.
1. Government-Sponsored Religious Activity
As discussed earlier ss a Niebuhrian perspective warns that an
active government that is itself rigidly secular will put a secularizing
pressure on culture and will interfere with religious freedom. One
common response by those who fear such a secularizing government
is to advocate that government itself sponsor religious activities or
religious symbols in the spheres that government over-
sees-particularly in the public schools, but also on public property
more generally. Official prayers or sermons and publicly funded
creches and other symbols are examples of this response. Niebuhrian
insights suggest that such actions are improper, as the Court has held
under the Establishment ClauseO'6 Such pronouncements by the
government create harm to dissenters, who are sent the message that
they are not full citizens. 7 As Niebuhr ultimately recognized, these
practices ignore the reality of pluralism by having government itself
voice one particular religious view selected from among the many
held by citizens. These Enlightenment-inspired concerns argue
strongly against such practices.
Moreover, there are evangelical arguments against such practices
too. As Niebuhr emphasized, it is almost guaranteed that the religion
created by government-directed rituals and symbols will be
government-controlled-"tamed." It will be the religion of the
"king's court and the king's chapel," as Niebuhr labeled Richard
Nixon's chapel services,' 8 rather than the prophetic religion that
subjects government to limits and criticism from an independent
255. See supra part II.C.2.a.
256. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 598-601 (1989) (holding that free-
standing cr6che on display in a courthouse was an impermissible governmental
endorsement of a religious message); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (prayers).
But cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680-85 (1984) (holding that display of creche on
public grounds among secular Christmas symbols did not violate the Establishment
Clause). There is a difference, of course, between using religious symbols and material to
celebrate a religious event (as do most government sponsored prayers and public creches)
and using them for other purposes (such as a museum's displaying art or an orchestra's
playing music that happens to have been religiously inspired, or a teacher discussing the
role that religion has played in history). Although the distinction may be difficult in some
cases, it is the one on which courts should focus.
257. Justice O'Connor has often emphasized this point in her opinions in religion cases.
See, e.g., County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625-27 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (disapproving
of government-sponsored criche because of its message of "endorsement" of Christianity).
258. See supra note 202-03 and accompanying text.
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perspective. The ceremonial prayer is watered down, at government's
direction, so as to appeal to all. With the creche in the town square,
government presses Christian symbols into service in the commer-
cialization of Christmas. Thus the majority in Lee v. Weisman
properly condemned the practice of government-controlled prayers:
"The suggestion that government may establish an official or civic
religion as a means of avoiding the establishment of a religion with
more specific creeds [is] a contradiction that cannot be accepted." 9
It might be argued in response that these costs to nonbelievers
and to religious integrity are not limited to government-sponsored
exercises, but can occur in any other situation in which religion
participates in public life. For example, to allow religiously grounded
visions to influence public policy in secular concerns carries with it the
potential for "imposing" the successful religious vision on some other
citizens who do not accept it.' On the other hand, proponents of
government-sponsored religion might argue that government-
sponsored prayers or creches are justified as a response to the
secularizing effect on society that would follow if an ever-larger
government were required to be scrupulously secular. Does not the
exclusion of prayer from school ceremonies, or religious symbols from
the Christmas holidays, turn the government's activity into a powerful
engine of secularization? Does it not send the message to religious
adherents that they are not full members of the community? 61
The answer to such arguments is to maintain the distinction
between government promoting religion itself and government giving
individuals and groups room to pursue religious values and, if they
wish, to bring religion into the public arena. The distinction between
the two is, of course, fundamental to a First Amendment that both
prohibits establishment and protects free exercise and free speech.
There need not be government-sponsored symbols and exercises in
order to address the pressures of secularization. Therefore, the harms
259. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2657 (1992).
260. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI.
L. REV. 115, 152-53 (1992) (criticizing the endorsement test for, among other reasons,
permitting the Court to "communicate a 'message of disapproval,' " and querying: "Why
is compelled exposure to governmental messages denigrating one's religion constitutional
[as in Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1066 (1988)] while avoidable exposure to governmental messages favorable to
another religion is not [as in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)]?");
Steven Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and
the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266, 309-13 (1987) (arguing that virtually
all governmental actions will alienate some people on religious grounds).
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that such practices cause are unjustified--"gratuitous," in Professor
Laycock's words.2 Religious citizens should be given ample outlets
for expression through private displays or ceremonies on public
property. Indeed, the First Amendment right of free speech requires
that the government give such access to religious groups if it has done
so for other groups.' A city can and should permit groups to put
up their own creches, menorahs, or other symbols in a public
park.2' The public school can, indeed must, permit the valedic-
torian to include religious expression in her graduation day speech if
she wishes. By such measures, the government accomplishes several
goals. It respects those citizens who have religious commitments, but
it also respects the interest of nonreligious citizens in not being
excluded by their government's actions and refrains from arrogating
the power to define proper religious values itself.
262. Laycock, supra note 48, at 380; Weisman, 112 S. Ct. at 2677 (Souter, J., concurring)
(arguing that students asking for graduation prayer "have no need for the machinery of
the State to affirm their beliefs"). Professor Laycock, for example, distinguishes between
government-sponsored religious rituals and religious involvement in temporal political
debates:
[O]n matters of governmental policy, somebody has to rule.... [But iln the case
of religion, no one has to rule. There is no need for the government to make
decisions about Christian rituals versus Jewish rituals versus no religious rituals
at all. For government to make that choice is simply a gratuitous statement
about the kind of people we really are. By making such statements, the
government says the real American religion is watered-down Christianity, and
everybody else is a little un-American.
Laycock, supra note 48, at 379-80. The distinction between religious political activism and
religious public rituals can also be defended on more full-blooded theological grounds
common to Judaism and Christianity. Again, remember the words of Amos: "I hate, I
despise your feasts, and I take no delight in your solemn assemblies.. . . But let justice roll
down like waters, and righteousness like an everflowing stream." Amos 5:21-24.
263. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2147 (1993)
(holding that school district may not distinguish religious group among other community
groups in denying after-hours access to school premises); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
277 (1981) (ruling that university may not single out religious group from among other
university student groups for exclusion from school facilities).
264. See, e.g., Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 619 (7th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that
private group's display of religious paintings in city park did not violate Establishment
Clause); McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716,730 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that village violated
Free Speech Clause by denying permit to private group to display creche in park, a public
forum), affid without opinion by an equally divided Court sub nom. Board of Trustees v.
McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985).
265. A case wrongly decided the other way is Guidry v. Calascieu Parish Sch. Bd., 9
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REP. 118,118-19 (E.D. La. 1989), affdper curiam on other grounds
sub nom. Guidry v. Broussard, 897 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1990).
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2. Accommodation of Independent. Religious Exercise
The problem of government-fueled secularization, however,
remains. As secular government expands into many areas of life, the
obligations it imposes threaten to push religion to the margins. While
Niebuhrian insights indicate that government-sponsored religious
activities are an inappropriate response to this problem, they also
indicate that government should, within broad limits, accommodate
the independent exercise of religion by groups and individuals: that
is, government should "remove[ ] obstacles to the exercise of...
religious conviction[s that are] adopted for reasons independent of the
government's action.
'2 66
This principle involves two currently contested areas of religion
clause law: (1) protection for religious groups and believers from
general laws or obligations that restrict religious practice; and (2)
participation by religious groups and believers in general government
programs, where the exclusion of religion would work to discourage
religious practice. Niebuhr supported accommodation in both kinds
of cases, arguing that "[c]ooperation, entered into freely by the state
and church and involving no special privilege to any church and no
threat to the religious liberty of any citizen, should be permitted."267
a. Exemptions from Laws Burdening Religious Practice
Currently, the most important legal issue involving accom-
modation concerns general laws that happen to restrict religious
practice: Under what circumstances, if any, is the government
constitutionally permitted or compelled to free religious practice from
burdensome laws?2" Examples raising this issue range widely, from
drug or alcohol laws that would prevent the use of particular
substances in religious rituals, to land-use regulations that dictate
where a church may locate or how it may configure its building, to
draft laws that may result in the conscription of citizens conscien-
tiously opposed to war.
266. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response
to the Critics, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 685, 686 (1992).
267. Niebuhr, Editorial Notes, supra note 158, at 34.
268. For academic discussion, see Gey, supra note 32, at 180-85 (attacking exemptions);
Laycock, supra note 153, at 1013-18 (defending exemptions); McConnell, supra note 266
(defending exemptions); Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court":
Kurland Revisited, 1989 SuP. Cr. REv. 373, 373 (attacking exemptions).
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Present First Amendment law distinguishes sharply between
accommodations that are compelled by the Free Exercise Clause and
those that are not compelled but are permitted under the Establish-
ment Clause. In Employment Division v. Smith269 the Supreme
Court held that the government is almost never constitutionally
required to exempt religious conduct from a law that is "neutral and
generally applicable."'  Congress, however, soon enacted the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, providing statutory protection for
religious exercise even against general laws, except when the
government's regulatory interest is "compelling.""27 Moreover, the
Court has made clear that legislative accommodations are
constitutionally permissible so long as they do not unduly favor
religion over nonreligion, or one religion over others. 2
Arguments for accommodation, whether by constitutional
mandate or legislative grace, are bolstered by Niebuhr's insights on
religion and politics.273 Above all, exemptions from general laws are
crucial to preserving the constitutional value of free exercise in the
face of the secularizing pressure of government against which Niebuhr
269. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (rejecting free exercise claim of Native Americans who
used peyote in religious rituals in violation of anti-drug laws).
270. Id. at 877.
271. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993)). For discussion, see Thomas C.
Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. REv. 1 (1994); Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221.
272. See also Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 (1987)
(upholding exemption of churches from laws against religious discrimination in
employment); Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2492
(1994) (striking down creation of special school district to serve religious community on
ground that other religions might not be so favored, but reaffirming Amos); Texas Monthly
v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1,14-17 (1989) (plurality opinion) (striking down sales tax exemption
limited to religious publications, but stating other exemptions are permissible).
273. The arguments here are for accommodations in general, and do not focus on the
question (important as it is) whether the text and history of the Free Exercise Clause
indicate that accommodations should be constitutionally mandated or merely permitted.
I believe that the far better construction of the Free Exercise Clause is the one that
requires exemptions in some cases. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise,
1990 Sup. Cr. REV. I passim; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109 passim (1990). But see, e.g., William P. Marshall,
In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 308 passim (1991);
Ellis West, The Case Against A Right to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NoTRE DAME J.
L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591 passim (1990) (arguing against religion-based exemptions).
Not only do the text and history point to that result, but guaranteeing the free exercise of
politically unpopular religions-of which there may be many in a secular-minded
world-demands the availability of constitutionally mandated exemptions declared by
politically insulated judges.
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warned. As Professor Laycock points out, "in the modern regulatory
state, most activities and institutions are pervasively regulated";
without exemptions, "churches and the religious conduct of believers
will be pervasively regulated too." 4  All of the Niebuhrian ar-
guments against a thoroughly secularized public order 5 weigh in
favor of accommodating religion, where possible, through exemptions
from general secular laws. Accommodation is necessary if religious
citizens and groups are to pursue their moral visions, contribute those
visions to the power-focused world of politics, and stand as a
counterbalance to the power of the state. 6
These considerations go far toward answering the claim by
opponents of accommodation that such measures are improper
because they favor religion over other beliefsY7 The Free Exercise
Clause, of course, singles out religious exercise for protection. The
combination of arguments set forth in part II helps to explain why
religious freedom should be vigorously protected. Religion articulates
a set of meanings that by their nature stand beyond the strivings of
the government and thus emphasize the government's limited nature.
As Niebuhr puts it, religion offers a distinctive "vantage point" from
which "to judge the self-deification of nations."'  By speaking
about ultimate values outside of history, religion emphasizes the
274. Laycock, supra note 3, at 848.
275. See supra part II.C.2.
276. As Stephen Carter has summarized, in this account of religious freedom,
religious groups [serve] as autonomous moral and political forces, intermediate
institutions, separate heads of sovereignty vital to preventing majoritarian
tyranny. Thus, the reason for accommodation becomes not [just] the protection
of individual conscience, but the preservation of the religions as independent
power bases that exist in large part in order to resist the state.
CARTER, supra note 1, at 134.
277. In most cases, accommodation does not "favor" religion in the stricter sense of
actually encouraging religious practice; rather, it merely removes an obstacle to a practice
already adopted by a group or individual. Few people are about to become Amish
because of the exemption of Amish children from certain education requirements. When
an accommodation is likely to encourage religious practice to a much greater degree than
it removes an impediment to such practice, current Establishment Clause doctrine rightly
implies that it should be struck down. See, e.g., Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18
n.8 (1989) (plurality opinion) (noting that the public school "release time" program upheld
in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), did not "coerce students who wished to remain
behind to alter their religious beliefs"). The specific "release time" program at issue in
Illinois ex rel McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), probably violated this
standard. By requiring non-participating students to sit idly in study halls during the
release time period, it imposed costs on such students and may have encouraged them to
attend the religious classes. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 227 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
278. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
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state's inability to realize such ultimates itself. It therefore places a
powerful theoretical brake on state authority. The protection of
religious groups, as one sort of "intermediate institution," adds a
practical limit on the state's power to impose its ideals on all parts of
society.279
To many observers, of course, religion's focus on ultimate values
is nothing but dangerous; the secular Enlightenment view thus fosters
a suspicion not simply of government sponsoring religion, but also of
government respecting religious freedom. In the words of Justice
Frankfurter (who tussled with his friend Niebuhr over these matters
after the McCollum decision 0 ), to accommodate a person's
behavior because of its religious motivation is objectionable because
"[it is only in a theocratic state that ecclesiastical doctrines measure
legal right or wrong.'"' Again, however, this ignores the Niebuhr-
ian insight that governments, as well as holders of the secular
viewpoints that governments are permitted to reflect, will seek to
aggrandize themselves as well.
The Niebuhrian balance of power, I argue, is best preserved when
government does not promote or advance religious ideas or practices
itself but accommodates the free exercise of religion by individuals
and groups unless there is a strong need to prevent the religious
practice. This distinction confines government to its proper role of
pursuing proximate goals, while leaving the pursuit of ultimate truths
to individuals and the groups they form. At the same time, giving
respect to free exercise values helps to ensure that the "proximate"
focus of politics will not degenerate into a pure cynicism, but will be
leavened with perspectives about ultimate truths. Freeing religious
conduct from laws that prohibit such conduct where the government
lacks a strong interest in regulation allows religious groups to survive
and continue to play their role in offering such perspectives.
Opponents of religion-specific accommodations also raise the
spectre of "balkanization," with government forced to accede to the
varying and possibly conflicting wishes of many religious groups.'
Justice Frankfurter reflected this view: In McCollum, he attacked the
program for releasing students to attend religious classes, by arguing
279. For parallel discussion, see CARTER, supra note 1, at 131-34; McConnell, supra
note 261, at 151-52; Stephen Pepper, Conflicting Paradigms of Religious Freedom: Liberty
Versus Equality, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 7, 22-26.
280. See supra notes 158-59, 192-94 and accompanying text.
281. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 653-54 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
282. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (citing commentators).
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that in order to ensure "cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic
people, the public school must keep scrupulously free from en-
tanglement in the strife of sects."'  Professor Suzanna Sherry has
suggested the principle-grounded, apparently, in an Enlightenment-
based view of church and state-that accommodations for religious
freedom may be improper if "the purpose of the religion clauses is to
allow a secular government to operate independent of the varied
religious beliefs of the citizenry.
' 4
This same concern was central to the dispute in Board of
Education of Kiryas Joel School District v. Grumet,25 last term's
decision striking down a law creating a separate public school district
to provide special education to handicapped children in a village of
Hasidic Jews. The Hasidic children-who because of their insular
religion and culture wore distinctive clothing and hairstyles and spoke
primarily Yiddish-had suffered "panic, fear and trauma" from
exposure to the larger, "mainstream" public schools where they first
attended special education classes; the new district provided them
with such education in culturally familiar surroundings, but it was
barred from teaching religious tenets.26 One might think that the
very purpose of setting up local school districts is to accommodate
such distinctive features of local populations, but the Supreme Court
struck down the district, holding that carving out a district for a single
religious sect violated the Establishment Clause requirement of
neutrality toward religion.' 7 Thus, the kind of accommodation of
cultural needs that is made through government actions all the time
was barred to a group because of its religious identity. Nevertheless,
283. Illinois ex reL McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 208, 216-17 (1948) (opinion
of Frankfurter, J.). The same attitude underlay Justice Frankfurter's refusal to recognize
conscientious exemptions from the demands of the law. In declaring the short-lived ruling
that Jehovah's Witness children could be compelled to salute the flag in school despite
their religious scruples, Frankfurter invoked the need for social cohesion and argued that
"[tihe ultimate foundation of a free society is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment."
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 596-98 (1940), overruled by Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943). Fifty years later, the Court in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
879 (1990), quoted and followed Gobitis in holding that the Free Exercise Clause never
requires an exception from a general law for sincere religious practice.
284. Sherry, supra note 16, at 152.
285. 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2484 (1994). I should disclose that I participated in drafting an
amicus brief in the Supreme Court defending the constitutionality of the special district.
286. Id. at 2485-86 (quotations omitted).
287. Id. at 2491-93. For further discussion, see Berg, Slouching Toward Secularism,
supra note 20.
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commentators hailed the decision as preventing religious
balkanization.'
Niebuhrian insights suggest that this special concern for religious
divisiveness is misplaced. It is unrealistic, Niebuhr would say, to
attribute social and political divisiveness solely or especially to
religion. Moreover, as Niebuhr wrote to Frankfurter after McCollum,
we cannot create "community... by emptying our culture of all its
differences or by pretending that actual differences do not exist." 9
Once again, a proximate solution is provided by the distinction
between promoting religion and accommodating religious freedom.
The concerns of divisiveness from government involvement in religion
justify banning government-sponsored religious practices, for such
practices are not necessary to free exercise. With respect to permit-
ting voluntary religious practice to go on freely, however, whatever
divisiveness concerns exist are outweighed by the need to protect free
exercise from an overpowering secular government. Therefore,
although accommodation of religion does sometimes require
legislatures or courts to make "difficult and controversial judgments
about the nature and strength of religious claims,"2' the value of
protecting religious difference justifies undertaking that task.291 If
the Enlightenment notion of "a secular government... operat[ing]
independent of the varied religious beliefs of the citizenry, 292 is
taken to the point of overriding serious claims to the free exercise of
religion, that Enlightenment notion is dangerous and should be
rejected. Reasonable measures of accommodation-whether in the
form of exemptions from general laws, or programs such as the
"release time" that Niebuhr defended in the 1940s-are appropriate,
so that we can take account of religious differences and, in Niebuhr's
words, "come to terms with each other despite our differences.,
293
b. Religious Participation in Publicly Funded Programs
The principle of accommodation also suggests that religiously
affiliated institutions should not be barred from participation in
288. For typical reactions, see, for example, Court Says N.Y School Violates
Church/State Rule, MINN. STAR-TRm., June 28, 1994, at 6A (noting that civil liberties or-
ganizations and some religious groups "cheered" ruling); The Religious Village, WASH.
POST, June 29, 1994, at A22 ("any other conclusion [would have been] startling").
289. Niebuhr, Editorial Notes, supra note 158, at 34.
290. McConnell, supra note 266, at 689.
291. Laycock, supra note 273, at 31-33.
292. Sherry, supra note 16, at 152.
293. Niebuhr, Editorial Notes, supra note 158, at 34.
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general publicly funded programs, such as those concerning social
services and education. The law in this area remains in substantial
confusion. Although in recent years the Supreme Court has upheld
numerous forms of aid, especially to individuals rather than directly
to religious institutions,294 earlier cases that adopt an almost ab-
solute "no aid" approach remain good law, at least for now.
295
Disputes over claims for funding of religiously affiliated schools
are not new. Such disputes also flared up immediately after World
War II, primarily over aid to Catholic schools, and these disputes
contributed to what sociologist Will Herberg called a "marked
deterioration of Protestant-Catholic relations., 296 In those conflicts,
Reinhold Niebuhr stood almost alone among Protestant leaders in
arguing for the inclusion of Catholic schools in certain kinds of
funding.2' Niebuhr's arguments are still relevant today. His
primary concern, as in other instances, was that an absolute separation
between religion and the activist, welfare state would "lead[ ] to the
secularization of our culture.""29  These fears are well grounded
when, as now, government runs a system of subsidized schools that
are shielded from religious influences but teach competing ideas
ranging from secular moral theories to patriotism to evolution to (in
colleges at least) Marxism. The financial pressure on families to
choose low-cost public schools over a religiously informed education
does work a powerful discrimination against (at least some) religious
ideas and in favor of the secular teachings in the schools.
Government's financial pressure works in favor of one set of ideas
294. See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2462, 2469 (1993);
Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 482 (1986); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 390 (1983); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617-18 (1988)
(holding that substantial aid to religious social service agencies is not per se violative of
the Establishment Clause).
295. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1985); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397-98 (1985); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 796-98 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971). For
a catalog of inconsistencies in school aid cases, see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112-13
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
296. Will Herberg, The Sectarian Conflict Over Church and State: A Divisive Threat to
Our Democracy?, 14 COMMENTARY 450, 450 (1952); see also STOKES & PFEFFER, supra
note 62, at 420-46 (discussing disputes over such aid). One form of aid, the payment of
expenses for bus transportation, was upheld by the Supreme Court in Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947).
297. See Niebuhr, School Issue, supra note 160, at 254; see also Herberg, supra note 296,
at 453 (noting nearly uniform Protestant opposition to any aid for Catholic schools);
MORGAN, supra note 148, at 66 (citing Niebuhr and others supporting Catholic inclusion
as small in number).
298. Niebuhr, School Issue, supra note 160, at 255.
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and against a genuine pluralism in education. Thus, Niebuhr went so
far as to charge opponents of aid to Catholic schools with making
"absolute claims in the name of democracy." 299
Opponents of public funding for religiously affiliated schools and
social services are wrong simply to rely on the historical record of
opposition to assessments for religion by, for example, James Madison
in Virginia and the Baptists in New England and Virginia." Their
arguments fail to take practical account of the differences between the
eighteenth century and today. The tax assessments that were
challenged in the 1780s went solely to support churches, in a context
in which government taxed citizens for relatively few other purposes.
Today, the disputed aid goes not to churches as such, but to the
schools and social services that religious groups operate-services that
provide direct benefits to the broader community. Moreover, activist
government has now stepped into the arena to provide tax-subsidized
alternatives to these religiously affiliated schools and social services.
In the modern era, to aid citizens who want such services in a
religious setting is equitable; to bar such aid is a form of
discrimination.3"' In writing in support of some aid to Catholic
schools, Niebuhr highlighted this change in practical effect that has
resulted from the expansion of the government into education. He
argued that in order to maintain neutrality, the specific contours of
the line between church and state must be "subject to amendment in
the light of new developments.... [T]he modern state with its wide
taxing powers can not so easily be separated from any vital aspect of
community concern as the [founding] fathers assumed."3"
The legal debate over aid to religious institutions can also be
informed by Niebuhr's insights concerning the difficulties of main-
taining a "pure" religion in the public sphere."3 In cases such as
Aguilar v. Felton, the Court has maintained that barring government
aid to religiously affiliated schools is necessary to prevent the
"secularization of a creed" that comes with conditions on the aid."
This line of argument, however, is probably disappearing from school-
299. Id. at 254.
300. The earliest example of such reliance is Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson, 330
U.S. at 34-42.
301. For a similar argument distinguishing the two historical situations, see McConnell,
supra note 261, at 184-85.
302. Niebuhr, School Issue, supra note 160, at 255-56.
303. See supra notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
304. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985); see also supra note 39 and accom-
panying text.
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aid cases,30 5 and rightfully so. Niebuhr's arguments, for example,
remind us that some compromise may well be necessary in order to
apply the ideals of religion in public life and culture: "We cannot
purge ourselves of the sin and guilt in which we are involved by the
moral ambiguities of politics without also disavowing responsibility for
the creative possibilities of justice."3" In any event, the decision
whether or not to compromise and accept some government
regulation as the price of funding should be left up to the church, not
to a court. Once again, the best "proximate solution" to these
problems is religious freedom-leaving to religious groups themselves
the decision whether and to what extent they should accept
compromise in the course of the struggle to remain active in society.
Using a typology developed by H. Richard Niebuhr, a prominent
theologian and Reinhold's brother, legal scholars have cogently
argued that religious freedom requires that the state, as much as
possible, permit different religious communities to choose different
ways of relating to the broader culture, including the response of
being highly "acculturated."3" Some religious groups-those that
tend to be more acculturated-are able to live within reasonable
guidelines that accompany government funding. It makes little sense
to invoke their own freedom to overturn an arrangement with which
they are comfortable. The decision whether to accept government aid
with reasonable strings attached should be left up to the church.08
305. It is rejected or ignored in all of the recent cases cited in note 294.
306. NIEBUHR, HUMAN DESTINY, supra note 63, at 284.
307. See Angela C. Carmella, A Theological Critique of Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 782,784-95 (1992) (discussing H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND
CULTURE (1951)); Michael W. McConnell, Christ, Culture, and Courts: A Niebuhrian
Examination of First Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 191, 220-21 (1992)
(same).
308. "An atheist plaintiff asserting a church's right to be left alone even at the cost of
losing government aid is the best possible illustration of why there are rules on standing."
Douglas Laycock, The Right to Church Autonomy as Part of the Free Exercise of Religion,
in 2 GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 28,38 (D. Kelley ed., 1986).
Of course, government regulations that accompany aid may be so intrusive and
unjustified as to constitute an infringement on the religious institution's free exercise. The
only point here is that when the religious institution is willing to accept reasonable
regulations designed to ensure that aid is used for the prescribed purposes, the institution's
decision should not be overturned in the name of helping it to remain "pure."
Moreover, there is an important distinction here between the "corruption" of religion
that accompanies government aid and the "corruption" that follows from government-
controlled religious exercises. In the former case, unlike the latter, the consequences of
the government's action are confined to a particular religious institution, whose leaders
have acceded to the aid. Thus the "corrupting" effect of governmental involvement is not
a reason to strike down government aid, but it is a reason to strike down government-
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3. Religious Pluralism and Accommodation Today
If anything, the arguments above have become more powerful in
the years since Niebuhr wrote. Even as late as the early 1960s,
Niebuhr could state that in some sense America had a "single culture"
defined by mainline Protestantism;3  correspondingly, he could still
assert the ultimate primacy of the public school in helping to form
that single culture. But the intervening thirty years have seen an even
greater explosion of cultural and religious pluralism. Niebuhr could
hardly predict, for example, the simultaneous rise in the 1980s of
various forms of "multiculturalism" and of aggressive conservative
religion-competing forces that strain the single institution of the
public school to the breaking point. When, for example, the
distribution of condoms in public schools finds a sufficient constituen-
cy to be enacted as a policy, yet a large number of conservative
families remain implacably opposed, the government simply cannot
serve as a "neutral" moral arbiter. This suggests all the more that a
purely secular public sphere is not neutral in any meaningful sense.
It also suggests, however, that the solution to the problem of
government-driven secularization cannot be found by injecting
government-selected religious tenets into public institutions. As
pluralism increases, such tenets become increasingly "particular"-a
step further from, rather than toward, neutrality. Instead, the solution
must be found in accommodating independent religious
decisions-allowing religious citizens to be exempted from programs
that they sincerely oppose, and permitting experimentation, at least,
with voucher systems and other forms of privatization in the delivery
of education and social services (while maintaining government's role
in providing funding and setting general program guidelines).
CONCLUSION
This Article has suggested ways in which Reinhold Niebuhr's
insights on ethics, religion, and politics might inform church-state
relations and be translated into proximate solutions, that is, specific
rules of law. Niebuhr's goal, born of a deep appreciation of both the
possibilities and dangers of all systems of thought, was to avoid both
an unmitigated secularism and an overreaching, coercive religion. I
controlled religious exercises and displays.
309. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Crisis in American Protestantism, 80 THE CHRISTIAN
CENTuRY 1498, 1498 (1963).
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have argued that with respect to religious participation in politics, the
Niebuhrian stance welcomes religion as a full participant, but calls on
religious activists to express humility by presenting their arguments in
terms others can understand. With respect to other church-state
questions, the Niebuhrian stance is deeply concerned with the
problem of secularization driven by an active secular government.
Nevertheless, Niebuhrian insights suggest that government-sponsored
religion is an inappropriate means to address the problem. Instead,
government should, through various means, accommodate the
independent religious activity of individuals and groups.
Nevertheless, the Niebuhrian emphasis on complexity and
ambiguity in the relation of religion and politics cannot be entirely
captured in specific legal principles. It is here that the "dispositional
ethic" that Niebuhr sketched for religious and political activists
becomes so important. Niebuhr vividly taught how to combine
vigorous advocacy with deep humility. Achieving that balance is not
an easy task in law and politics, but it is one that is crucial. It is
especially crucial ift as I have argued, one cannot sidestep the dangers
of religious zeal in politics by trying to separate religion strictly from
public life. We must look to religious views themselves, as well as
secular views, to find reasons to be humble and tolerant even as we
engage in political conflict. Humility inculcates the willingness to
reach proximate solutions, because we realize the potential for truth
in our opponents' perspective and the potential for partiality and
complacency in our own. And even when vigor demands that we not
compromise, humility inculcates a "sense of pity and forgiveness for
those who contend against our truth and oppose our action., 310
The combination of vigor and humility is too often lacking in
debate concerning the issues of the current "culture wars," including
the issue of how to relate religion and politics. On one hand, citizens
who are wary of the certainties proclaimed by activists too often
despair of reaching any solutions to intractable social problems. On
the other hand, activists on both sides of the culture wars too often
display little humility. Both sides need internal voices to do for them
what Niebuhr did for his own community of political and religious
liberals: to reconstruct their basic commitments while working to
purge them of false certainties and utopian illusions. Such views are
appearing on both sides of the cultural divide today. Some thinkers
on the cultural right, while remaining committed to traditionalist
310. NIEBUHR, HUMAN DESTINY, supra note 63, at 217.
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theology and conservative political perspectives, are producing
sophisticated critiques of the assumptions, goals, and tactics of
conservative activists.3  On the other hand, Stephen Carter,
operating from a far more liberal political perspective, has written
powerfully about the arrogance of secular liberalism and the
contributions of religion to public life.312 All those involved in
political activism on moral issues should pay attention to these
writers.
As the debate over church and state rages on, the writings of
Reinhold Niebuhr can and should serve as a powerful resource for
persons in any camp who see the need for nuance, self-criticism, and
a decent respect for the opinions and perspectives of their opponents.
Moreover, Niebuhr's religious vision provides a necessary reminder
not only of the limits of today's political perspectives, but of the limits
of human striving itself:
Nothing that is worth doing can be achieved in our lifetime;
therefore we must be saved by hope. Nothing which is true
or beautiful or good makes complete sense in any immediate
context of history; therefore we must be saved by faith.
Nothing we do, however virtuous, can be accomplished
alone; therefore we are saved by love. No virtuous act is
quite as virtuous from the standpoint of our friend or foe as
it is from our standpoint. Therefore we must be saved by
the final form of love which is forgiveness.
3 13
311. As examples of such self-critical literature among evangelical Protestants, consider
CHARLES COLSON, KINGDOMS IN CoNFLIcT 43-49 (1987) (pointing out distinction between
political and spiritual goals); MARK A. NOLL ET AL., THE SEARCH FOR CHRISTIAN
AMERICA 17 (1983) (criticizing the claim that America has been or should be a "Christian
nation"); No GOD BUT GOD: BREAKING WITH THE IDOLS OF OUR AGE (Os Guinness
& John Seel eds., 1992) (criticizing evangelicals' faith in material success, political activism,
self-help methods, and other "idols").
312. CARTER, supra note 1, at 67-101.
313. NIEBUHR, IRONY OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 81, at 63.
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